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ADVISORS AS FIDUCIARIES
Arthur B. Laby*
Abstract
This Article provides a sustained account of advice giving as a
fiduciary activity, and it demonstrates that the dominant approach to
defining fiduciary relationships is flawed. Leading academic
commentators assert that fiduciary relationships only arise when one
party has discretion over the assets or affairs of another. Yet, many
advisors—such as lawyers, doctors, and investment professionals—lack
discretion over a principal’s assets or affairs but are nonetheless
considered fiduciaries by the courts. The dominant academic view of
fiduciary relationships is therefore incomplete because it does not
account for purely advisory relationships.
Drawing on interdisciplinary literature on trust and the normativity of
advice, the Article demonstrates that imposing a fiduciary duty on certain
advisors is not only consistent with contemporary judicial practice, but it
is also normatively correct. In addition, the Article builds a framework
for assessing which advisors should be subject to fiduciary responsibility.
Not everyone who provides advice should be subject to fiduciary liability.
Thus, the Article proposes factors to determine which advisors should be
subject to fiduciary duties.
This Article addresses a matter of widespread importance. Most
people rely on fiduciary advisors to aid with critical decision-making.
Yet, the dominant academic approach would wrongly denude these
advisors of fiduciary responsibility merely because they lack
discretionary authority over their clients’ assets or affairs. This result
would have adverse consequences for the advisory relationships on which
most people rely.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years, legal scholars have attempted to capture the
essence of the fiduciary relationship. Their approaches vary, but most
appear to agree that fiduciary relationships arise when one party, the
fiduciary, has discretion over the assets or affairs of another, the principal.
The “discretionary authority” view of fiduciary relationships is pervasive
in fiduciary scholarship and reflected in court decisions. Not surprisingly,
many scholars also agree that the primary purpose underlying the
fiduciary obligation is to guard against the fiduciary’s abuse of
discretionary authority. Under this approach, fiduciary status arising from
discretion is closely linked to an instrumental justification for fiduciary
duties, namely deterring abuse.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/1
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 10

2
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Laby: Advisors as Fiduciaries

2020]

ADVISORS AS FIDUCIARIES

955

The fiduciary obligation of professional advisors challenges the
discretionary authority view. In many cases, advisors lack power or
discretion over a principal’s assets or affairs; yet advisors often are
considered fiduciaries and subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care. This Article examines advisors’ fiduciary obligations and assesses
the merits of the discretionary authority approach. The primary claim is
that many advisors who lack discretion over their clients’ assets or affairs
are and should be considered fiduciaries and, therefore, the discretionary
authority view of the fiduciary relationship is incomplete.
That advisors often are considered fiduciaries should not be
controversial. Business advisors, investment advisors,1 lawyers,
physicians, and others are often deemed fiduciaries, although they lack
discretionary authority. Recognizing that many advisors are fiduciaries
has two implications for fiduciary theory, one regarding fiduciary status,
the other regarding justification. First, the common claim that discretion
is a necessary feature of all fiduciary relationships is erroneous. Many
advisors lack discretion but are considered fiduciaries nonetheless.
Second, the conventional justification for imposing fiduciary duties is
inadequate. The conventional justification is that the fiduciary obligation
serves to reduce the risk of abuse of discretionary authority and to
diminish the chance that the fiduciary will misappropriate the principal’s
assets over which the fiduciary exercises power or control. When
fiduciary relationships arise in the absence of discretionary authority,
however, the need to control discretion is absent, and the conventional
justification for imposing fiduciary duties is not applicable. As a result, a
justification for imposing fiduciary duties that turns on controlling the
fiduciary’s discretion alone must be mistaken.
What then is the justification for placing a fiduciary duty on an
advisor, who is not vested with discretionary authority? Drawing on
literature on trust and the normativity of advice, I argue that the
justification arises from the trust that advisors seek from their clients and
the trust that clients repose in their advisors. Certain advisors assume a
role that generates a relationship of trust and, as this Article explains, one
can view the act of advising—in the words of Edward Hinchman—as an
invitation to a client to repose trust in the advisor. Trust, however, also
leads to a client’s vulnerability and to reliance on an advisor, who is often
1. There is an arcane debate over whether the term “advisor” should be spelled with an
“e” or an “o.” “Advisor” is more conventional, but Congress spelled the word with an “e” in the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA). See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b1 to 80b-21 (2018). As a result, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and many
securities lawyers use “adviser,” not “advisor,” although some securities lawyers use “adviser”
for advisers regulated under the IAA and “advisor” for other advisors, such as broker-dealers,
who provide advice but are not regulated under the IAA. For ease of reference and to avoid
confusion, this Article follows the conventional spelling but recognizes the existence of both
spellings in practice.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 11

3
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 1

956

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

more expert and sophisticated than the client in the subject matter of the
advice. The fiduciary duty for advisors grows out of the nature of the trust
relationship, and it prevents the harm that can befall a vulnerable client
when trust is misplaced. Although trust may not be an essential
component of all fiduciary relationships, it is an essential component of
advisory relationships, and it serves as the foundation for an advisor’s
fiduciary duty.
This Article fills an important gap in the literature on both advisors
and fiduciary relationships. Although many advisors are considered
fiduciaries, courts are split on advisors’ fiduciary status.2 Moreover, the
provision of advice has bedeviled fiduciary law scholars, who recognize
that advisory services do not fit well into standard accounts of fiduciary
relationships.3 A few scholars have examined the provision of advice in
the context of fiduciary relationships.4 This Article, however, is the first
2. Compare Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he relation
between an investment advisor and the people he advises is not a [categorical fiduciary
relationship].”), and Edwards v. Mutter, 18 CVS 2818, 2019 WL 6894511, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2019) (“North Carolina law has not recognized an investment advisor-client relationship
as a de jure fiduciary relationship.”), with SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
191 (1963) (explaining that in passing the IAA, Congress recognized that advisors owe a fiduciary
duty to clients), and EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. 2005) (“A
fiduciary relationship ‘exists . . . when one [party] is under a duty . . . to give advice for the benefit
of another’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979))).
3. See, e.g., EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY 332–33
(2016); Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 993, 1035–37 (2017); Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 83–84 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); Lionel
Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra, at 157 [hereinafter Smith, Can We Be Obliged]; Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships:
Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 LAW Q. REV. 608, 618
(2014) [hereinafter Smith, Fiduciary Relationships]; Julian Velasco, Delimiting Fiduciary Status,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 80–81, 87–90 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold
eds., 2018).
4. See Andrew S. Gold, Trust and Advice, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST 35, 37–38 (Paul B.
Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020) (analyzing trust and dependence in advisory fiduciary
relationships); Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of
Interest, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 478, 479 (2005) (examining whether the relationship between
investment banks providing financial advisory services and their clients is fiduciary); Andrew
Tuch, Securities Underwriters in Public Capital Markets: The Existence, Parameters and
Consequences of the Fiduciary Obligation to Avoid Conflicts, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 51, 52 (2007)
(“[I]t is the financial advisor dimension of the [underwriter-issuer] relationship that is key to the
existence of fiduciary obligations.”); Andrew Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions,
94 TEX. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (2016) (arguing that mergers and acquisitions advisors “are properly
characterized as fiduciaries of their clients”); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The
Crisis of State and Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and
Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2013) (arguing that underwriters and
others should be subject to fiduciary duties when advising issuers regarding municipal bond
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general sustained account of advice giving as a fiduciary activity
including a justification for placing a fiduciary duty on advisors.
Determining whether and when advisors are fiduciaries is fundamentally
important to the conceptual structure of fiduciary law—and it is of great
interest as a doctrinal and practical matter.
The stakes are high. As this Article explains, there are several reasons
why fiduciary status is of utmost importance. Fiduciary law provides
unique remedies when compared to professional negligence or
professional malpractice. Fiduciary law encompasses a broader set of
misconduct; the requirements to prove damages are eased; and a breach
of fiduciary duty often carries more weight because it is viewed as more
serious than professional negligence or malpractice.
This Article proceeds in three parts. To begin, Part I examines whether
advisors that lack discretion over a principal’s assets or affairs are
considered fiduciaries and concludes that in many cases they are. Part I
surveys several types of professional advisors to support this claim:
business advisors, investment advisors, physicians, and lawyers.
Furthermore, in some contexts, where courts typically are unwilling to
impose fiduciary duties, advice giving turns the tables and leads courts to
hold that a non-fiduciary relationship is in fact a fiduciary one. Part I of
the Article explains and clarifies that advisors across various legal
domains, who lack discretionary authority, are considered fiduciaries.
Part I also sets the stage for a critique of the discretionary authority
approach in Part II.
Next, Part II sets forth two implications of Part I for fiduciary theory.
First, the discretionary authority approach, which generally holds that
discretion is a necessary element of fiduciary relationships, is an
incomplete theory of fiduciary duties because it cannot account for
advisors as fiduciaries. Second, the common justification for imposing
fiduciary duties—controlling fiduciary discretion—is similarly
incomplete because advisors with no discretionary authority are
considered fiduciaries nonetheless. Thus, there must be other reasons to
impose fiduciary duties.
Finally, Part III considers why courts should impose a fiduciary duty
on advisors. Part III describes and analyzes advisory relationships to
determine how the law should treat such relationships. It argues that
advisors often are and should be fiduciaries based on the trust that
advisors seek from their clients. Part III begins by discussing the key
offerings); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1, 8 (2014) (analyzing banker-advisors as fiduciaries under agency principles); See generally
Simone Degeling & Jessica Hudson, Financial Robots as Instruments of Fiduciary Loyalty, 40
SYDNEY L. REV. 63 (2018) (applying fiduciary duties to robo-advisors).
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characteristics of advice and the role of trust in advisory relationships. It
then explains that trust can lead to reliance and vulnerability on the part
of the advisee with respect to matters that are the subject of the trust
relationship. Part III explains that an advisor’s fiduciary duty arises from
the nature of the trust relationship. The fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care prevent the harms that can result when such a relationship is abused,
and they promote advisory relationships through ensuring that the advisor
acts in the advisee’s best interest.
Part III concludes with boundary considerations. At the end of Part
III, I recognize that not all instances of advice giving necessarily lead to
fiduciary liability. Imposing or attempting to impose fiduciary duties in
all instances of advice giving would be impractical and overly legalistic.
But the line drawing can be difficult. For example, why is it that an
automobile mechanic, who appears to provide diagnostic advice before
making repairs, is not considered a fiduciary? The Article proposes
several considerations to help determine whether and when courts should
impose fiduciary duties on certain advisors and not others. Not all forms
of advice should be the subject of fiduciary liability.
Overall, the Article makes three contributions to the literature on
fiduciary law and fiduciary theory. First, it clarifies, as a descriptive
matter, that advisors in many contexts are considered fiduciaries. Second,
it takes aim at the dominant discretionary authority approach to fiduciary
relationships and demonstrates that discretion is not and should not be a
necessary feature of such relationships. Third, it provides a sustained
defense of advisors as fiduciaries based on trust. In that regard, the Article
further develops the literature exploring in detail when certain members
of society—voters,5 politicians,6 partners,7 stockbrokers,8 parents,9 and
even friends10—should be considered fiduciaries.
The themes in this Article are particularly timely. Fiduciary theory has
exploded as a discipline over the past several years, with a growing
number of workshops, conferences, books, and articles devoted to
promoting a deeper understanding of fiduciary relationships and
5. Edward B. Foley, Voters as Fiduciaries, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153, 158, 181–82
(2015).
6. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 706–11 (2013).
7. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 237–46.
8. Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 443, 446, 452
(2010); Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 730 (2012).
9. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401,
2430–31 (1995); Lionel Smith, Parenthood is a Fiduciary Relationship, 70 U. TORONTO L.J. 395
(2020).
10. Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 707–14 (2009).
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fiduciary duties.11 Fiduciary advice, however, has remained relatively
unexplored in the academic literature. Moreover, federal and state
regulators seek to determine whether and when to impose fiduciary duties
on various professional advisors and what the scope of those duties
should be.12 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is split
over the application of fiduciary duties to certain advisors.13 Industry
groups and trade associations are also engaged in a heated debate over
when fiduciary duties arise for financial advisors.14 A clear understanding
of advisors as fiduciaries linked to a normative analysis of the essential
features of fiduciary relationships is, therefore, more important than ever.
I. FIDUCIARY ADVISORS
This Part considers whether, and under what circumstances,
professional advisors are considered fiduciaries. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, one who gives advice for the benefit of

11. See generally, e.g., FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW (Paul B. Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020); CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW
(Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016); FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur Laby
& Jacob Hale Russell eds., forthcoming); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 3; RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3; THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
12. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.575 (2019); Regulation Best Interest: The BrokerDealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240); Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 84
Fed. Reg. 33,669 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276); Fiduciary Duty of BrokerDealers, Agents, Investment Advisers, and Investment Adviser Representatives, 51 N.J. Reg.
949(a) (proposed June 17, 2019), https://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/Proposals/Pages/bos06172019-public-notice.aspx [https://perma.cc/FKX8-EY2A].
13. See Public Statement of Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, SEC Statement on Final Rules
Governing Investment Advice (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
statement-jackson-060519-iabd [https://perma.cc/PK4N-L5HM].
14. See, e.g., Letter from David Certner, Legislative Counsel & Legislative Policy Dir., to
The Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-18/s70918-4184409-172588.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRJ8GLDS] (arguing for strengthening the fiduciary standard for investment advisors); Letter from
Kevin R. Keller et al., Fin. Planning Coal., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-18/s70918-4185807-172700.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3DKK-GVRM] (criticizing the SEC proposal for investment advisor fiduciary duty as
too weak); Letter from Kurt N. Schacht et al., CFA Inst., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-18/s70918-4184335172561.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WDL-7P4M] (arguing that interpretation of advisors’ fiduciary
duty may be too strong); Letter from Craig Pfeiffer, President & CEO, Money Mgmt. Inst., to Mr.
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-07-18/s70718-4185314-172626.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2B3-FTS8] (criticizing the
SEC’s broad interpretation as too imprecise).
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another is a fiduciary.15 This is a bold claim with enormous implications
for individuals and firms that provide advice. The Restatement, however,
neither explains nor supports the statement. The sole reference, a citation
to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, does not support the proposition
that advisors are fiduciaries.16 Moreover, the Restatement’s claim is
overbroad. As discussed later in Part III, not every advisor who provides
advice for another’s benefit is, or even should be considered, a fiduciary.
The question of whether advisors are fiduciaries has interested certain
scholars for decades.17 When a car mechanic advises a customer to
undertake a repair, for example, the mechanic is not acting in a fiduciary
capacity and would unlikely be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty based
on the advice. Car mechanics, according to one court, are not normally
considered fiduciaries although mechanics owe duties of honesty and
care.18 By contrast, when an investment advisor recommends that a client
sell one security and buy another, the advisor often is considered a
fiduciary and must act in the client’s best interest.19 Courts struggle to
find guiding principles to explain why some advisors are considered
fiduciaries and others not. As one court stated, “The trust and confidence
that creates a fiduciary obligation is something more than the trust we
necessarily place in [advisors] having superior knowledge . . . .”20
Before discussing whether advisors are fiduciaries, the Article briefly
addresses the importance of fiduciary status. In other words, why should
one care whether advisors are considered fiduciaries? After all, if an
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979). The successor
to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 does not repeat the claim that one who gives advice for
the benefit of another is a fiduciary. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 (AM. LAW. INST.
2020). However, the Restatement (Third) contains an illustration to clarify that agreeing to provide
expert advice can result in a fiduciary relationship. Id. illus. 4.
16. Surprisingly, the reference to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959), tends to undermine the conclusion that one who
gives advice is a fiduciary. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts distinguishes between confidential
and fiduciary relationships and states that a “confidential relation exists between two persons
when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to . . . advise with the other’s interest
in mind.” Id. cmt. b (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, an
advisory relationship is a confidential relationship but not necessarily a fiduciary one. Id. The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts is careful to say that a confidential relationship is not a fiduciary
relationship. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts draws this statement from the Restatement
(First) of Trusts. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1935). The
Restatement (First), however, provides no additional explanation. Id.
17. See P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 49 (T.G.
Youdan ed., 1989) (explaining that the possible fiduciary status of advisors is “the most significant
controversy” in fiduciary law).
18. Int’l Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 88 C 9838, 1991 WL
349914, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1991).
19. See infra Section I.B.2.
20. Int’l Ins. Co., 1991 WL 349914, at *9.
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advisor can be liable for professional negligence or professional
malpractice, whether the advisor is a fiduciary may be irrelevant.
A. The Importance of Fiduciary Status
Before discussing whether advisors are fiduciaries, one might ask
whether fiduciary status has any practical importance, particularly if a
client can sue for professional malpractice based on a violation of the
relevant standard of care. Courts often dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty
claim as duplicative when based on the same operative facts as a claim
for professional negligence or professional malpractice.21 In the health
care context, courts often rely on negligence rather than fiduciary duty
when awarding damages.22
There are several reasons why fiduciary status is important. First,
although there is overlap between fiduciary law and professional
negligence, fiduciary law provides plaintiffs with a separate cause of
action that has a different focus and distinct remedies.23 Allegations of
breach of fiduciary duty often target dishonesty, unfaithful service,
conflicts of interest, and self-dealing.24 By contrast, allegations of
professional negligence target a breach of the duty of care.25
Second, the elements to support a breach of fiduciary duty claim are
not the same as the elements to support a professional malpractice claim.
To demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty, for example, a plaintiff can
prove either injury to the plaintiff or a benefit to the defendant.26 To
demonstrate professional negligence, however, the plaintiff must prove
actual damages to the plaintiff.27 The absence of a requirement to prove
21. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 500–03 (Ill. 2000) (explaining how a breach of
fiduciary duty claim can be duplicative of a medical malpractice claim); Majumdar v. Lurie, 653
N.E.2d 915, 920–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“When, as in this case, the same operative facts support
actions for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary resulting in the same injury to the client, the
actions are identical and the later [sic] should be dismissed as duplicative.”); Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (App. Div. 2004)
(stating that breach of fiduciary duty claims that are premised on the same facts and seeking
identical relief sought in legal malpractice claims are “redundant and should be dismissed”).
22. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to
Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1202 (2009); see
also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230–32, 234–37 (2000) (finding that medical malpractice
does not give rise to a fiduciary breach under ERISA).
23. See Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 22, at 1200.
24. See Metrick v. Chatz, 639 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
25. 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 304 (2020).
26. Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. App. 2006). Although many courts and
commentators state that an element is injury to the plaintiff, it is generally sufficient to show
benefit to the defendant.
27. Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1971), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 340.6(a)(1) (West 1995), as recognized in Adams v. Paul, 904 P.2d 1205 (Cal. 1995);
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damages provides a possible breach of fiduciary duty claim where a
negligence claim would be unavailable.
Third, a breach of fiduciary duty can encompass a broader scope of
misconduct than professional negligence. Breach of fiduciary duty can
apply when a professional has a duty to disclose a risk even if the
professional is not the source of the risk; professional negligence is
limited to situations where the professional causes the risk.28
Fourth, a breach of fiduciary duty is often viewed as more serious than
professional negligence. Not all instances of professional negligence
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.29 There are categories of
misconduct that are simply not viewed as serious enough to give rise to
fiduciary liability. The whiff of serious misconduct conveyed by
articulating a breach of fiduciary duty is another reason a plaintiff may
wish to claim that an advisor is a fiduciary.30
Fifth, fiduciary status is important for the available remedies.
Remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty are both stronger and more
flexible than remedies for other actions, such as professional negligence.
Fiduciary remedies combine relief typically available in contract, tort,
and equity.31 They include remedies to stop future violations, not only to
remedy past ones.32 Moreover, just as a plaintiff does not have to show
injury to bring a fiduciary duty claim, fiduciary remedies are available
even when the principal is unharmed, and the fiduciary has acted in good
faith.33
MC Baldwin Fin. Co. v. DiMaggio, Rosario & Veraja, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 22, 30 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006); Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 867 N.E.2d 385, 387 (N.Y. 2007).
28. An example is a requirement to disclose emergent medical risks—adverse medical
conditions that the physician either causes or discovers in the course of medical treatment, of
which the patient is unaware, and which could result in harm if not disclosed. Hafemeister &
Spinos, supra note 22, at 1170. There is a difference between a physician who causes an emergent
medical risk and fails to disclose it, and a physician who discovers an emergent medical risk
caused by another, or inherent in a patient, and fails to disclose it. See id. at 1203. Only the
former—when the doctor causes the risk—will likely give rise to a medical malpractice claim. Id.
Breach of fiduciary duty, however, could cover both scenarios. Id.
29. Metrick, 639 N.E.2d at 203; see also 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client, supra note 25, § 304
(discussing when an attorney can waive a right of the client without breaching his fiduciary duty).
30. See Metrick, 639 N.E.2d at 203.
31. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 248 (2011).
32. Id.
33. See Joshua Getzler, Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary Obligations: Understanding the
Operation of Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 41
(“The policy of nullification or prophylaxis is so crucial that even where no harm to beneficiary
interests is demonstrated and even where good faith is shown, the full gamut of remedies may be
applied to ensure that there is no taint affecting the fiduciary’s conduct.”). A standard remedy for
a breach of fiduciary duty is disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. A court may order disgorgement
regardless of whether the principal has suffered a loss or the fiduciary has engaged in willful
misconduct. Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570, 571 (2013)
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A final reason fiduciary status is important is for the availability of
certain legal theories in actions brought by third parties or regulators, and
not necessarily by the advice recipient. An example is insider trading
liability. Under the classical theory of insider trading, a duty to disclose
or abstain from trading arises when one party has information that another
is entitled to know because of a fiduciary relationship, or a similar
relationship of trust and confidence.34 Under the misappropriation theory
of insider trading, a person can be liable under the securities laws when
she misappropriates confidential information for trading in breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information.35 Thus, liability for
insider trading often depends on fiduciary status.36
When an advisor provides unsound, improper, or conflicted advice,
there may be several reasons to pursue a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty as opposed to a claim for professional liability. Thus, the next step
is to determine whether advisors are fiduciaries, particularly when they
lack discretion over a client’s assets or affairs.
B. Advisors as Fiduciaries
Many advisors are considered fiduciaries although they lack
discretionary authority over their advisory clients. To be clear, in some
cases, advisors can and do assume discretionary power. When they do,
courts often find a fiduciary relationship based on that authority. My
focus, however, is on advisors who lack discretion. As discussed in more
detail below, by discretion this Article invokes the definition of the term
generally used by writers in the fiduciary field. Discretion represents
(“[G]ain-based remedies are particularly remarkable in the fiduciary context because they are
available almost without limitation. They may be awarded whether or not the beneficiary suffered
a material set-back to interests or whether the fiduciary showed wilful intent to appropriate the
gain.”). Courts can even order disgorgement when a principal has gained as a result of a fiduciary
breach; the fiduciary will still be required to relinquish the fiduciary’s profits. Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 888 (“Even if the
fiduciary’s actions have not injured the beneficiary, and even if the beneficiary has in some sense
gained as a result of the fiduciary’s act, the fiduciary must account to the beneficiary for its
profits.”).
34. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
35. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650–52 (1997).
36. The importance of one’s status as a fiduciary in the insider trading context is borne out
in caselaw. A psychiatrist, for example, owes a fiduciary duty to a patient. Thus, when a doctor
traded based on information he received from a patient, he did so in breach of a duty owed to the
patient and was liable as a result. See SEC v. Willis, 825 F. Supp. 617, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). By
contrast, members of an exclusive club, the Young Presidents Club, did not owe a fiduciary duty
to one another although club members regularly sought advice from one another. United States v.
Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2002). As a result, trading by one member based on
information he received from another could not support an insider trading violation. See id.
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legal power over the significant practical interests of another.37 To
demonstrate that advisors shorn of discretionary authority are often
considered fiduciaries, this Section focuses on five cases: business
advisors, investment advisors, stockbrokers, physicians, and attorneys.
These professionals, as a descriptive matter, are often deemed fiduciaries
in cases where they lack a discretionary mandate. After surveying these
five examples, the Article briefly discusses the importance of advice in
determining fiduciary status—providing advice is often the key
consideration that transforms a person not normally considered a
fiduciary into a fiduciary.
1. Business Advisors
Banks and other business advisors provide business advice to
individuals and firms in need of their expertise.38 A bank does not
normally owe a fiduciary duty to a bank customer; the debtor–creditor
relationship typically is not fiduciary.39 A bank, however, may owe a
fiduciary duty to a customer when special circumstances exist. One of the
“special circumstances” is when a customer receives and relies on the
lender’s advice.40 When banks serve as business advisors, the relationship
is often considered fiduciary, although the bank has no discretion over
the customer’s funds or business affairs.41
Consider a pair of cases where banks provided business advice tainted
by a conflict of interest. The first is Buxcel v. First Fidelity Bank.42 In that
case, the Buxcels were looking to buy a business.43 First Fidelity advised
them to purchase a grocery store from the Fabers, who were also First
Fidelity customers.44 The Buxcels purchased the store, pledging their
37. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046–48 (1991); Miller,
supra note 3, at 69; D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1399, 1449 (2002).
38. See Laura Lin, The Information Content of a Bank’s Involvement in Private Workouts,
3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 97, 108 (1994).
39. United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“The
virtually unanimous rule is that creditor-debtor relationships rarely give rise to a fiduciary duty.”);
see also Buxcel v. First Fid. Bank, 601 N.W.2d 593, 603 (S.D. 1999) (Konenkamp, J., dissenting)
(“In ordinary lender-borrower relations, therefore, no fiduciary duty exists.”).
40. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the
Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 740–41, 768 (1994). The other
“special circumstances” are when the borrower reposes trust and confidence in the lender, and
when the borrower dominates or controls the borrower. Id. at 740–41.
41. Id. at 741.
42. 601 N.W.2d 593 (S.D. 1999).
43. Id. at 594.
44. Id. at 595.
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farm and home as collateral.45 First Fidelity financed the purchase and
advised the Buxcels to obtain a Small Business Administration (SBA)
guaranteed loan, which allowed the bank to reduce its risk.46
After the store failed, the Buxcels learned that the Fabers were heavily
indebted to First Fidelity.47 Moreover, First Fidelity wanted the Fabers to
sell the business so the bank could avoid foreclosing on the loan. 48 The
bank’s advice to the Buxcels, therefore, was tainted with a conflict of
interest. The Buxcels sued the bank alleging breach of fiduciary duty and
other claims.49 The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and held that special circumstances existed to create a fiduciary duty by
the bank to disclose the grocery store’s negative history.50 In Buxcel, the
bank acted merely as an advisor. It had no discretion over the Buxcels’
assets or affairs. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the bank had a
fiduciary duty to disclose its conflict.51
Similarly, in Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp.,52 the provision of
business advice shorn of discretionary authority gave rise to a fiduciary
relationship.53 There, Baychar Morris hired Steven Wood to renovate
Morris’s building.54 Part of the way through the work, Wood told Morris
that the project would be more expensive than anticipated, and Wood
advised Morris to seek financing from American Bank.55 Morris met with
American Bank’s Jonathan Young and sought Young’s advice about
continuing to use Wood for the job, questioning Young about Wood’s
ability and integrity.56 Young told Morris that she need not worry about
Wood and she should not consider alternative contractors.57 Young
further advised Morris to pay Wood using Morris’s personal funds and
reimburse herself with a loan from American Bank.58 Young did not
disclose that Wood was delinquent on debts owed to American Bank,
thereby creating a conflict of interest for the bank.59 The bank would be
more likely to collect from Wood once Wood was paid by Morris.60
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 597–99.
Id. at 596.
622 A.2d 708 (Me. 1993).
Id. at 712.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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Morris sued American Bank for breach of fiduciary duty, and the bank
counterclaimed for amounts due on Morris’s loan.61 A jury decided for
Morris on the breach of fiduciary duty claim.62 The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court held that the jury could have found a fiduciary relationship
based on trust and confidence and the disparity of position and influence
between the parties.63 Moreover, the court appeared to recognize that
Young did not exercise control over Morris. The court rejected the
argument that to find a fiduciary relationship, the principal must be
incapable of protecting her own interests.64 Thus, business advisors, such
as First Fidelity and American Bank, can be subject to fiduciary duties
although they lack control over the customer’s assets or affairs.
2. Investment Advisors
Investment advisors are often considered fiduciaries regardless of
whether they exercise discretionary authority over client assets.
Investment advisors are regulated under federal statutes and the common
law.65 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA)66 defines an
investment advisor as a person or a firm that is in the business of
providing advice about securities for compensation.67 Some advisors
exercise discretion over client assets; others do not.68 Advisors registered
with the SEC must indicate whether they have discretion over client
funds, and the amount of their assets under management for which they
have discretionary authority.69 All investment advisors regulated under
the IAA, even those without discretion, owe a fiduciary duty to clients
and potential clients.70 Federal law does not exempt nondiscretionary
advisory accounts from the fiduciary obligation.
61. Id.
62. Id. The RTC, which assumed receivership of American Bank, challenged the jury’s
finding that the bank breached its fiduciary duty. Id. at 711–12.
63. Id. at 712.
64. Id.
65. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2018). Other
statutes, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018)), can apply to advisors in certain
circumstances.
66. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21).
67. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
68. An advisor exercises discretion if the advisor is authorized to determine which securities
to buy or sell for an account or if the advisor makes decisions about what securities to buy or sell.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(35), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(35) (2018).
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2019); Form ADV (Paper Version), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/22JU-2L
2X].
70. See, e.g., United States v. Lay, 566 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“SEC
registered investment advisers, and their officers and directors, have a fiduciary duty to their
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The leading case is SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.71 In
Capital Gains, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed an SEC enforcement
action against an advisory firm, which published investment newsletters,
for a practice known as scalping.72 Scalping occurs when an advisor buys
a security for its own account, recommends that clients purchase the same
security, then sells the security at a profit without disclosing the firm’s
interest.73 In Capital Gains, the firm had no discretionary authority. In
fact, clients did not open advisory accounts with the firm; they subscribed
to a newsletter.74 Furthermore, there was no evidence that clients ever
purchased shares of the recommended securities.75 Indeed, the firm did
not even know whether any subscriber followed its recommendations.76
As a result, the firm was not vested with discretion.
The Court held that the advisor’s conduct was a breach of fiduciary
duty and a violation of the IAA’s antifraud provision.77 In language that
has become the axiom of professional investment managers, the Court
stated that advisors must adhere to a duty of “utmost” good faith, a duty
of full and fair disclosure of all material facts, and an obligation to use
reasonable care to avoid misleading clients.78 Over fifty years later, the
SEC, securities lawyers, and investment professionals still look to
Capital Gains for the standard articulation of an investment advisor’s
fiduciary duty, regardless of whether the advisor has discretion over
investor funds.79 One might be tempted to dismiss the investment advisor
clients, which includes acting in good faith in the best interest of the client, making full and fair
disclosure of material facts regarding the investment relationship, and employing reasonable care
to avoid misleading the client.”), aff’d, 612 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2010).
71. 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (holding that the IAA prohibits scalping).
72. Id. at 181–83.
73. See SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (defining scalping).
74. See Affidavit of Harry P. Schwarzmann at 26–27, Capital Gains, 375 U.S. 180 (No.
618); Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 182–83.
75. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 748 (2d Cir. 1961), reh’g
granted, 306 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
76. Brief for Respondents at 6, Capital Gains, 375 U.S. 180 (No. 42), 1963 WL 105899, at
*6.
77. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 201 (“The high standards of business morality exacted by
our laws regulating the securities industry do not permit an investment adviser to trade on the
market effect of his own recommendations without fully and fairly revealing his personal interests
in these recommendations to his clients.”).
78. Id. at 194 (describing fiduciary duty).
79. See, e.g., SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 567–68 (2d Cir. 2009); SEC v. Levine, 671 F.
Supp. 2d 14, 27 (D.D.C. 2009); Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, 75 Fed.
Reg. 41,018, 41,021–22 (July 14, 2010); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of
Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 856–57 (2009).
That advisors owe a fiduciary duty to potential clients as well as clients is another reason
demonstrating that advisors are fiduciaries even when they lack discretion. The IAA’s antifraud
provision, and by implication the advisor’s fiduciary obligation, apply to both clients and potential
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example as a unique obligation imposed by Congress. Neither the IAA
nor the Capital Gains case, however, imposed a fiduciary duty on
advisors. Congress and the Court merely recognized advisors’ preexisting
common law fiduciary duty, which applies to clients and potential clients
regardless of the advisor’s discretionary authority over client funds.80
3. Broker-Dealers
The case of broker-dealers is more complex than that of investment
advisors. Brokers perform different functions than investment advisors,
and they are subject to different regulation, although they too often
provide investment advice to customers.81 The general rule, consistent
with the discretionary authority approach, is that when a brokerage
account is discretionary, the broker is considered a fiduciary; however,
when the account is nondiscretionary, the broker is held to a standard of
suitability—a duty to ensure that the recommended securities are suitable
for the particular customer.82 Notwithstanding the general rule, the law is
clients. Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2018). In the case of a potential client,
the advisor by definition lacks discretion. The relationship is preliminary; no final decision has
been made regarding whether an advisory relationship will form. Yet, even at this stage, an advisor
owes a fiduciary obligation to these potential clients. See SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71
(D.D.C. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. SEC v. Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
80. See Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1085–86 (2011). Similarly, ERISA defines a fiduciary with
respect to a plan as anyone who exercises discretionary authority over the management of a plan
or plan assets, or anyone who renders advice for compensation with respect to money or other
property of a plan. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(21)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2018); see also Definition of “Fiduciary,” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2019)
(clarifying that advice under ERISA includes nondiscretionary advice). One might be tempted to
dismiss the ERISA example as a unique statutory scheme. But like in the case of the IAA, ERISA
fiduciary law is based on the common law of trusts. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973), as reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649 (“The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and
makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of
trusts.”); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 93-533 with approval).
81. Broker-dealers are regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018)). Although many brokers also
meet the definition of investment advisor discussed above, the definition contains an exclusion
for broker-dealers as long as their advice is incidental to brokerage services, and they receive no
special compensation for providing advice. See Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(C), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2018); see also Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of BrokerDealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 403–05, 412–21 (2010) (detailing and
analyzing the broker-dealer exclusion).
82. See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers,
55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 719 (2010); id. at 723 (“Most courts, looking to state law for guidance,
conclude that only brokers for discretionary, as opposed to non-discretionary, accounts are
considered fiduciaries.”). In 2019, the SEC revised the broker-dealer standard of conduct with
respect to retail customers and imposed a “best interest” obligation on brokers. See Regulation
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more nuanced when a special relationship develops between a broker and
a customer, and courts hold that, absent discretion, brokers who provide
advice can be fiduciaries.
Consider two examples. First, in MidAmerica Federal Savings &
Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/American Express Inc.,83 MidAmerica
established a money market fund and needed to reinvest certain assets for
short periods.84 MidAmerica spoke to Don Crow, a Shearson
representative, who recommended that MidAmerica purchase certain
GNMA unit trusts that Crow said would perform like other GNMA
securities.85 GNMA unit trusts, however, were designed for small
investors to buy and hold, and they carried an additional sales charge,
making them unsuitable for short-term investment.86 When Shearson
would not agree to rescind MidAmerica’s purchases, MidAmerica sued
for breach of fiduciary duty and other violations.87 The court stated that
although MidAmerica’s account was nondiscretionary, which would
normally preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship, that fact
would not defeat MidAmerica’s fiduciary claim.88 Shearson was in a
position of strength, and MidAmerica relied on Crow’s
misrepresentations.89 As a result, the court found sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s decision that a fiduciary relationship existed and that
Crow breached his fiduciary duties.90
Similarly, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng,91
the court clarified that a fiduciary relationship can arise in the context of
a nondiscretionary brokerage account.92 William Grace, a Merrill Lynch
representative, agreed to act as the Chengs’ broker with respect to a
nondiscretionary account.93 The Chengs alleged that after Grace assisted
them for a year, he engaged in a series of unauthorized transactions.94 The
Chengs claimed that they had a fiduciary relationship with Merrill Lynch
based on the trust and confidence they placed in Grace and on his

Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,328 (July 12,
2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
83. 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 1251.
85. Id. at 1251–52.
86. Id. at 1252.
87. Id. at 1253.
88. Id. at 1258.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 697 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1988).
92. Id. at 1226–27.
93. Id. at 1225.
94. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 25

17
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

970

[Vol. 72

agreement not to trade without approval.95 Merrill Lynch argued that a
fiduciary relationship cannot arise when an account is nondiscretionary.96
The court, however, sided with the Chengs and upheld a fiduciary
relationship.97 Thus, even when a customer opens a nondiscretionary
brokerage account, the relationship can be fiduciary—setting aside the
general rule that brokers to nondiscretionary accounts are not fiduciaries.
4. Physicians
When providing patient care, physicians in some circumstances can
have discretionary authority over a patient’s treatment. Surgeons, for
example, must occasionally make intraoperative decisions with no
opportunity to consult the patient or the patient’s close relatives.98 In rarer
cases, physicians have authority over a patient’s decision to forgo lifesustaining treatment.99 Physicians also can act in an advisory capacity
where they lack discretionary authority, leaving medical decisions in the
patient’s hands after full disclosure of treatment options and the attendant
risks.100 Where physicians act as advisors without discretion over patient
care, as demonstrated below, courts often impose a fiduciary obligation
to define physicians’ duties. Imposition of a fiduciary obligation in these
cases is consistent with the general principle that physicians are
fiduciaries.101 A physician’s fiduciary obligation includes a duty to
disclose information about a patient’s care, disclose conflicts of interest
about a physician’s compensation, and maintain confidential
information.102

Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id. at 1226–27.
See Rhona Flin et al., How Do Surgeons Make Intraoperative Decisions?, 16 QUALITY
& SAFETY HEALTH CARE 235, 235 (2007).
99. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 840 (2d ed. 2000).
100. Physicians as advisors is a trend that is likely to grow as medicine transforms from a
model of paternalism, where the physician knows what’s best, to a model of patient autonomy,
where patients make their own decisions after full disclosure. For a popular account of this
historical shift, see BARRON H. LERNER, THE GOOD DOCTOR x–xi, xiv (2014).
101. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 312
(5th ed. 2001) (“The patient-physician relationship is founded on trust and confidence; and the
physician is therefore necessarily a trustee for the patient’s medical welfare.”); S. SANDY SANBAR,
ET AL., LEGAL MEDICINE 245 (5th ed. Mosby 2001) (“The relationship between patient and
physician is one known to the law as a ‘fiduciary relationship’ (good faith and trusting).”); E.C.
Hui, Doctors as Fiduciaries: Do Medical Professionals Have the Right Not to Treat?, 3 POIESIS
& PRAXIS 256, 274 (2005).
102. FURROW ET AL., supra note 99, at 328; see Peter Bartlett, Doctors as Fiduciaries:
Equitable Regulation of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 5 MED. L. REV. 193, 199 (1997).
95.
96.
97.
98.
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In Hahn v. Mirda,103 a patient was told she had an aggressive form of
cancer and treatment would likely be unsuccessful.104 She underwent
intensive chemotherapy and had a radical mastectomy.105 The diagnosis
turned out to be erroneous, but the doctors did not tell the patient the truth
when they learned of it; instead, she found out two years later when one
of the physicians testified about her situation in a deposition.106 The court
held that the doctors had a fiduciary duty to inform the patient that she
did not have cancer when they became aware of the facts.107 The doctor–
patient relationship, the court explained, is a fiduciary relationship, and a
doctor is prohibited from misrepresenting the nature of the patient’s
condition.108 The physicians in Hahn lacked power or authority over the
patient’s care when the breach occurred.109 Although the physicians may
have had discretion over the patient’s treatment at the time of her
procedure, when the physicians realized that the diagnosis was faulty, the
procedure was long over.110
Similarly, in Lockett v. Goodill,111 a patient underwent a successful
appendectomy but was paralyzed in both legs after the operation.112 The
patient sued for negligence, and the defendants argued that the plaintiff
had signed a liability release when settling with the hospital’s insurance
agent.113 When the patient signed the release, however, he had incomplete
information—he believed he would be without use of his legs for only
one year and, therefore, he agreed to settle for payments of $108 per week
for one year.114 The court held that the physician–patient relationship is a
fiduciary relationship “of the highest degree,” and the plaintiff’s
physicians had a fiduciary duty to inform him that his assumption
regarding use of his legs was likely wrong.115 In both Hahn and Lockett,
the physicians lacked discretion over the plaintiffs’ care once the surgery
was complete. They had no discretionary power, but they were

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527 (Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 528–29.
Id. at 529.
Id.
See id. at 532.
Id.
See id. at 529.
See id.
430 P.2d 589 (Wash. 1967) (per curiam).
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591.
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responsible for a fiduciary breach as a result of the failure to advise about
the patients’ condition.116
In the case of physicians, failure to disclose information postprocedure, as in the examples above, can be contrasted with failure to
disclose pre-procedure. In pre-procedure cases, plaintiffs often allege
breach of fiduciary duty for physicians’ failure to disclose facts that are
material to obtaining consent to treatment.117 In pre-procedure cases,
courts are concerned about whether a decision to submit to treatment truly
rests with the patient as opposed to the doctor if full disclosure is not
forthcoming. Thus, in pre-procedure disclosure cases, one might say that
the physician, although acting as an advisor, has discretion or control over
the patient’s condition.118 By contrast, in post-procedure cases, such as
Hahn and Lockett, this type of physician control is absent because the
procedure has already occurred. In post-procedure cases, one cannot
claim that the physician has discretion or control over the patient’s
condition. Notwithstanding this lack of discretion, courts impose a
fiduciary duty.
5. Lawyers
Some fiduciaries are regarded as owing stronger obligations than
others, and lawyers top the list.119 Stephen Gillers has written that, as a
fiduciary, a lawyer must treat clients fairly and place their interests above
116. See Tetstone v. Adams, 373 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing that
a fiduciary relationship exists between a physician and a patient, imposing on the physician a duty
to disclose known facts to the patient about her condition).
117. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
118. See id. at 483–85 (recognizing that a person of “sound mind has the right, in the exercise
of control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to . . . medical treatment,”
and a physician seeking patient’s consent must disclose the physician’s personal, economic, or
research interests to satisfy the physician’s fiduciary obligation (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.
3d 229, 242 (1972))).
119. See Peters v. Thedford, No. 94-60250, 1995 WL 413016, at *2 (5th Cir. June 13, 1995)
(per curiam) (“The rule is well settled that the relationship of an attorney to his client is one of
uberrima fides, and transactions between them affecting the subject matter which the attorney is
employed to protect will be strictly scrutinized . . . .” (quoting Johnson v. Cofer, 113 S.W.2d 963,
965 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938))); In re Howrey LLP, No. 11-31376DM, 2014 WL 5311258, at *8
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014) (“The relationship between attorney and client is a fiduciary
relation of the very highest character, and binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity—
uberrima fides.”), aff’d sub nom. McGrane v. Howrey, LLP, No. 14-cv-05111-JD, 2015 WL
6126792 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015), aff’d sub nom. In re Howrey LLP, 698 F. App’x 881 (9th Cir.
2017). Gillers gives three reasons for the status of lawyers as being owed stronger fiduciary duties.
See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 70–71 (9th ed. 2012). First, a client depends on
the lawyer’s integrity, fairness, and knowledge, and will set aside usual caution when dealing with
a lawyer. Id. Second, a lawyer might have confidential information about a client, thereby giving
the lawyer an unfair advantage when dealing with the client. Id. at 71. Third, a client often cannot
change her lawyer and is therefore dependent on him. Id.
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all others with respect to the representation.120 In certain contexts, a
lawyer makes decisions on a client’s behalf and, in that regard, acts with
discretion. When litigating, for example, a lawyer must often think on her
feet, acting, speaking, and arguing for a client without checking with the
client first.121 By contrast, when a lawyer advises a client on a legal
matter, such as whether to litigate or settle, enter into an agreement, or
execute a transaction, the lawyer is not making decisions for the client;
she is providing her judgment on the best course of action, leaving
ultimate decision-making in the client’s hands.
The lawyer’s advisory role is common.122 Most lawyers spend their
time not in the courtroom but rather in their offices counseling clients—
they are on the phone, drafting emails or memoranda, or otherwise
advising on discrete issues.123 Acting as a counselor or advisor requires
the lawyer to understand the legal issues before her as well as the broader
personal or business contexts in which the legal issues arise.124 The
lawyer as counselor generally does not have discretion over the client’s
assets or affairs; it is the other way around—the lawyer as advisor acts to
promote the client’s discretionary authority.125 Charles Wolfram has
explained that the lawyer will typically perceive her role as a nonpreemptive counselor, that is, counseling without preempting important
areas of client autonomy.126 Unlike litigation, which is retrospective,
counseling is prospective and preventive. The idea is to avoid litigation
by helping the client plan and strategize to achieve his ends.127
When an attorney acts in an advisory capacity, an attorney–client
relationship is formed, and the attorney owes a fiduciary duty to the

120. GILLERS, supra note 119, at 70.
121. A lawyer often acts as the client’s agent doing things directly attributable to the client.
Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 76–77
(1980) (explaining that a lawyer becomes an extension of legal and moral personality of the
client).
122. See, e.g., In re SRC Holding Corp., 364 B.R. 1, 26 (D. Minn. 2007), rev’d sub nom.
Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 553 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2009); Admiral Merchs. Motor
Freight, Inc. v. O’Connor & Hannan, 494 N.W.2d 261, 265–66 (Minn. 1992); Togstad v. Vesely,
Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980); see also Richard A. Corwin, Ethical
Considerations: The Attorney-Client Relationship, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1327, 1342 (2001) (explaining
that a lawyer becomes an advisor as a natural consequence of the attorney–client relationship).
123. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 688 (student ed. 1986).
124. The ABA’s Model Rule 2.1 provides that in rendering advice, a lawyer can refer not
only to the law, but also to moral, economic, social, and political factors relevant to the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
125. See id. at r. 2.1 cmt. 1; see also Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining
Private Law Duties in Public Law Relations, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 285, 311–12 (2015).
126. WOLFRAM, supra note 123, at 688.
127. Id. at 691.
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client.128 A difficult question is whether a court will treat a claim against
a lawyer-advisor as a negligence and legal malpractice claim, or as a
breach of fiduciary duty claim. If the gist of the claim is that the attorney
did not exercise the proper degree of care, skill, or diligence, then the
claim is one of negligence.129 However, if the claim is that the lawyer
failed to disclose a conflict of interest, failed to withdraw in light of a
conflict, or failed to advise a client to retain separate counsel, then the
claim is a proper breach of fiduciary duty claim.130
A good example is a fee claim brought by a group of plaintiffs who
suffered property damage from plumbing systems made from defective
polybutylene pipes.131 The plaintiffs sued their lawyers, Fleming,
Hovencamp & Grayson, P.C. (FH&G), for breach of fiduciary duty and
legal malpractice for seeking excessively high fees and failing to disclose
a conflict of interest.132 Under a series of contingency fee agreements,
FH&G was entitled to a 40% fee for sums recovered by judgment or
settlement, and a 45% fee if the matter was appealed.133 Settlement was
reached with two manufacturers, which called for payments of $170
million and replacing plumbing in the plaintiffs’ property.134 Several
months later, after the settlement was finalized, the court ordered a series
of fairness hearings to determine whether the attorneys’ fees and
expenses were reasonable.135 At the fairness hearing stage, FH&G had a
conflict of interest: it was in the firm’s interest to have the fees upheld; it
was in the plaintiffs’ interest to have the court lower the fees because they
were excessive.136
The lawyers did not disclose their conflict of interest with their clients
in connection with the fairness hearings.137 It was only after the court
lowered the fees, and the attorneys filed their appeal, that they
acknowledged to the plaintiffs that the fee issue raised a conflict.138 Note
that at the fairness hearing stage, when the lawyers failed to disclose their
conflict, they had no discretionary authority over their clients’ affairs.
128. Developments in the Law–Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1322 (1981); see also In re Makowski, 374 A.2d 458, 460 (N.J. 1977) (“The fact that
the advice in this instance was more of a business than of a legal nature, does not relieve
respondent of a duty to adhere to the high ethical standards exacted of a lawyer.”).
129. Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, LLP, 97 S.W.3d 179, 189 (Tex. App. 2002).
130. See id. at 189–90.
131. Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 25 S.W.3d 863, 866 (Tex. App. 2000).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 867.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
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The case had effectively concluded; the only open issue was whether the
previously negotiated fee would be lowered. The key question was
whether the lawyers had a duty to tell the plaintiffs about the potential
conflict of interest in time for them to secure other counsel to represent
them at the fairness hearing.139 The court of appeals ruled that the lawyers
had such a duty, reversed the ruling on the breach of fiduciary duty claim,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.140
A variety of advisors owe clients fiduciary duties although the
advisors lack discretion over the clients’ assets or affairs. Business
advisors, investment advisors, stockbrokers, physicians, and lawyers all
have been deemed fiduciaries subject to duties of loyalty and care in their
advisory capacity. As the next Section shows, acting in an advisory
capacity will, in some cases, convert a non-fiduciary relationship to a
fiduciary relationship, demonstrating a link between advice giving and a
fiduciary obligation.
C. The Importance of Advice in Creating Fiduciary Relationships
The previous Section demonstrated that courts often hold that
advisors, even those who lack discretionary authority, are fiduciaries.
Furthermore, providing advice can be a trigger that transforms a nonfiduciary relationship into a fiduciary one. Certain courts point
specifically to advice as the essential conduct that creates a fiduciary
relationship. Examples can be found in cases adjudicating disputes over
auditors’ and underwriters’ duties. Auditors and underwriters are
typically not considered fiduciaries. When they step outside of their
traditional roles, however, and provide advice to clients, the advisory role
transforms the non-fiduciary relationship into a fiduciary one with respect
to the advice provided.
Let us first look at auditors. In In re Cendant Corp. Securities
Litigation,141 Cendant alleged that Ernst & Young (E&Y) breached its
fiduciary duty of care, among other ways, by failing to discover
accounting irregularities perpetrated by former senior management and
failing to bring the irregularities to management’s attention.142 E&Y

139. Id. at 873.
140. Id. at 874; see also Li Che v. Hsien Cheng Chang, No. PX 16-2665, 2017 WL 3383038,
at *11, *15 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim
against attorney who provided advice to two parties whose interests conflicted); BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468, 481–82 (D.D.C. 1997) (denying motion to
dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim against lawyers when the lawyers were advising two
entities while the first entity was planning to acquire a subsidiary of the second).
141. 139 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.N.J. 2001).
142. Id. at 608.
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argued that auditors are not fiduciaries to their audit clients.143 The firm
maintained that the very nature of being an “independent” public
accountant means that the accountant’s fidelity is to public investors, not
the audit client.144 Although the court agreed that the accountant–client
relationship is generally not a fiduciary relationship, it found an exception
for accountants who provide advice.145 “[W]hen the auditor’s relationship
goes beyond merely rendering an independent audit and providing
investment advice, such a [fiduciary] relationship may exist.”146 Cendant
alleged that E&Y’s work went beyond providing an independent audit;
rather, E&Y provided advice upon which it knew Cendant would rely.147
The court held that those facts, if proven, would establish a fiduciary
relationship.148
Another context in which advice can transform a non-fiduciary
relationship into a fiduciary relationship is securities underwriting. In
EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,149 the New York Court of Appeals
held that an underwriting agreement for an initial public offering (IPO)
typically would not create a fiduciary duty for the underwriter.150
However, an advisory relationship between an underwriter and issuer,
marked by trust and confidence, would give rise to a fiduciary duty.151 In
the 1990s, eToys, Inc. decided to go public to obtain additional financing
and retained Goldman as lead underwriter.152 After eToys entered
bankruptcy, unsecured creditors sued Goldman on behalf of the
company.153 The complaint alleged that eToys relied on Goldman’s
advice, which Goldman provided without disclosing a conflict of
interest.154
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. &
COM. L. 119, 124–26, 154–57 (2006) (discussing independence of auditors in contrast to other
gatekeepers, such as lawyers).
145. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 610.
148. Id.; see also Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
district court did not err in finding a fiduciary relationship when an accountant held himself out
as expert investor thereby cultivating a relationship of trust on which the client relied).
149. 832 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 2005).
150. Id. at 31–32.
151. Id. at 31–33.
152. Id. at 29.
153. Id. at 30.
154. Id. Goldman arguably had an incentive to underprice eToys in the IPO, resulting in
lower offering proceeds. Id. Goldman had entered arrangements with customers, which obligated
them to repay Goldman a portion of their profits obtained from the sale of eToys shares after the
IPO. Id. Thus, a lower IPO price would mean more customer profit and a higher Goldman payout.
Id.
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Goldman argued that the relationship between an issuer and
underwriter is not fiduciary—it is a standard arm’s length relationship.155
The court generally agreed but concluded, in this case, that the complaint
alleged an advisory relationship as well.156 eToys reposed confidence in
Goldman’s knowledge and expertise to advise eToys as to the correct IPO
price.157 As a result of this advisory role, Goldman had a fiduciary
obligation to disclose conflicts of interest, and the investment bank
breached its duty by concealing its conflict.158 The court isolated the
advice as the subject of the fiduciary duty: “We stress, however, that the
fiduciary duty we recognize is limited to the underwriter’s role as
advisor.”159
Advisors who lack discretion over their clients’ affairs are often
considered fiduciaries. Business advisors, investment advisors, brokers,
doctors, and lawyers operate in a professional capacity advising their
clients, and, in many instances, they lack discretionary authority over
their clients’ assets or affairs. Nevertheless, they are considered
fiduciaries and subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
Moreover, advice giving has been singled out as an activity that brings
about a fiduciary relationship. Thus, not only are advisors often deemed
fiduciaries, giving advice can serve as the key ingredient that triggers a
fiduciary obligation. The next Part considers the importance of Part I for
fiduciary theory.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY VIEW
In some cases, fiduciary relationships form when one party has
discretion over a principal’s assets or affairs. It is ill-considered, however,
to turn this single feature, common in many fiduciary relationships, into
a generalized theory applicable to all. When discussing fiduciary duties,
Joshua Getzler described this approach as the “base/superstructure”
model, where a principle at the base supports a superstructure of detailed
law.160 This model, or something like it, has been employed by a number
of writers in their attempts to arrive at a comprehensive theory of
fiduciary relationships.161
Legal scholars who subscribe to the discretionary authority view focus
on discretion as the essential feature of fiduciary relationships. They often
articulate a theory of fiduciary relationships, based on discretion, with
155. Id. at 31.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 32.
160. Getzler, supra note 33, at 40.
161. See J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 51–91 (1981) (providing a discussion of
eight theories, or groups of theories, of the fiduciary relationship).
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two parts: (1) an explanation of when fiduciary relationships arise, and
(2) a justification for imposing fiduciary obligations. As Part I
demonstrated, discretion is not an essential feature of fiduciary
relationships.
This Part explores in more detail the claims of those writers who
promote the discretionary authority approach. It points to faults in the
argumentation and explains why the approach is incomplete. This Part is
divided into two primary sections. First, it discusses fiduciary status and
the claim that discretion is a necessary feature of all fiduciary
relationships. In doing so, it explains that this approach must be mistaken
because the fiduciary advisors identified in Part I lack discretionary
authority. Next, this Part examines the claims of several writers,
including Professors Paul Miller, Lionel Smith, Evan Criddle, and Evan
Fox-Decent, who support the discretionary authority view but who also
recognize that advisors pose a challenge to that view. These writers try to
reconcile the discretionary authority view with advisors’ fiduciary duties.
As I shall explain, however, their attempts leave too many unanswered
questions and are ultimately unsuccessful.
Second, this Part discusses the proposed justification for fiduciary
duties in the context of the discretionary authority approach. An emphasis
on discretion has led to the claim that fiduciary duties are necessary to
control the very discretion that purportedly characterizes fiduciary
relationships and to protect principals from theft, self-dealing, or other
harmful conduct that can occur when one has discretionary power over
another. This justification, however, is ultimately unsatisfying as many
fiduciaries lack discretionary authority. Later, in Part III, the Article
proposes a justification for placing fiduciary duties on advisors that is not
tied to discretionary authority.
A. Fiduciary Status
This Section addresses whether fiduciary status arises strictly in the
context of discretionary authority. For decades, many fiduciary scholars
have maintained that fiduciary relationships arise only when one party
has discretionary authority over another. These claims appeared nearly
fifty years ago and persist today. Although not all writers insist that
discretion is a necessary feature of fiduciary relationships, many—
perhaps most—do. As this Section will elaborate, however, the
discretionary authority approach fails from both descriptive and
normative perspectives. Moreover, although some scholars recognize that
advisors pose a challenge to the discretionary authority approach and
attempt to address the challenge, this Section explains why those attempts
ultimately are not persuasive.
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1. The Dominance of the Discretionary Authority View
Generations of fiduciary scholars have identified discretion as the
fundamental feature that sets fiduciary relationships apart from other
legal relationships. Certain courts subscribe to the discretionary authority
view as well. In Varity Corp. v. Howe,162 the U.S. Supreme Court stated
that, in the ERISA context, “the primary function of the fiduciary duty is
to constrain the exercise of discretionary powers which are controlled by
no other specific duty imposed by the trust instrument or the legal
regime.”163 In United States v. Chestman,164 an insider trading case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “[a] fiduciary
relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency: One
person depends on another—the fiduciary—to serve his interests.”165 A
leading Canadian case, Frame v. Smith,166 held the same.167 In some
respects, statements by courts supporting the discretionary authority
approach are unsurprising. After all, the archetype fiduciary is the trustee,
who typically exercises control over trust assets. And fiduciary
relationships developed, at least in part, by analogy from the trust
relationship.168
Before going further, we should pause briefly and consider the
meaning of the term “discretion.” Reference to the single word
“discretion” masks the many ways the term is employed in fiduciary law
and fiduciary theory. Some scholars adhere to a property-based view of
discretionary authority, where a fiduciary is someone who controls
tangible property belonging to a principal.169 Others adhere to a powerbased version, where discretion entails power over another’s affairs.170 In
most accounts discussed below, the fiduciary must have authority to
162. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
163. Id. at 504 (emphasis omitted). This statement is puzzling given that, as discussed above,
ERISA defines “fiduciary” to include any person who renders advice as well as any person who
exercises discretion over the management of a plan or plan assets. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(2018). For a more detailed discussion of fiduciary status under ERISA, see Arthur B. Laby, Trust,
Discretion, and ERISA Fiduciary Status, in FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BUSINESS (Arthur B. Laby &
Jacob H. Russell eds., forthcoming 2021).
164. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
165. Id. at 569.
166. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (Can.).
167. Id. at 136 (“Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have [sic] been imposed seem
to possess three general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some
discretion or power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to
affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to
or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.”).
168. See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY 12 (2010); Velasco, supra note 3, at
78.
169. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 213–215 and accompanying text.
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change the principal’s legal or practical position.171 Moreover, discretion
does not mean the mere exercise of judgment on another’s behalf. To be
fair, the views of certain fiduciary scholars regarding the role of
discretion have evolved as the field has matured. However, those
espousing the discretionary authority approach generally employ a
stronger definition of discretion than merely exercising judgment for
another’s benefit. To demonstrate the pervasiveness of the discretionary
authority approach, I examine claims by a number of fiduciary scholars,
including, when possible, the relevant meaning of discretion.
Many scholars argue that discretion is essential for a fiduciary
relationship to arise.172 Writing in 1975, Ernest Weinrib explained that
two elements form the “core” of the fiduciary concept. First, the fiduciary
must be able to exercise discretion; second, the fiduciary’s discretion
must be capable of affecting the principal’s legal position.173 Although
Weinrib occasionally includes advice under the rubric of discretion, he
refers not to general advisory services but rather to discretion to advise
or negotiate in such a manner that will change the principal’s legal
position.174 Thus, not only must Weinrib’s fiduciary be vested with
discretionary authority, she must also have sufficient authority to
effectuate a change in the principal’s legal status.175 The reason agents,
trustees, partners, and directors are fiduciaries, Weinrib maintained, is
that they have discretion in dealing with third parties and can affect a
principal’s legal position.176
Other early writers on the fiduciary relationship echoed this theme. In
the 1980s, Tamar Frankel wrote that fiduciary relationships have two
“central feature[s].”177 The first is that the fiduciary serves as a substitute
for the principal, whom Frankel labeled an “entrustor,” because of the
power the principal entrusts in the fiduciary.178 A principal, Frankel
explained, may wish to be relieved from performing certain functions,

171. See infra notes 173–224 and accompanying text.
172. D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610 n.6
(2014) (“Discretion is universally recognized as an essential aspect of fiduciary relationships.”)
(citing numerous sources to support the importance of discretion in fiduciary relationships).
173. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975) (“First,
the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of discretion, and, second, this discretion must be
capable of affecting the legal position of the principal.”).
174. Id. at 7 (“The reason that agents, trustees, partners, and directors are subjected to the
fiduciary obligation is that they have a leeway for the exercise of discretion in dealings with third
parties which can affect the legal position of their principals.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 808–09 (1983).
178. Id. at 808.
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and instead engages the fiduciary to perform those functions for her.179
The second central feature is that the fiduciary must obtain power from
the principal or a third person to enable the fiduciary to act effectively.180
Echoing Weinrib, Frankel explained that power enables the fiduciary to
make changes that affect the entrustor.181 As a result, Frankel’s delegation
of power goes beyond providing advice; the fiduciary’s power must rise
to the level where the fiduciary can change the principal’s position. Two
examples Frankel provides are transferring possession of securities to a
broker and giving a broker discretion to trade on a customer’s behalf.182
In more recent writings, Frankel adheres to this view.183
Deborah DeMott has written extensively about fiduciary
relationships. Over twenty-five years ago, DeMott reviewed theories of
the fiduciary obligation and concluded that discretion is a common
theme.184 After summarizing various approaches, she wrote that the
fiduciary obligation is a device that allows the law to respond to a number
of situations where one person’s discretion should be controlled because
of aspects of that person’s relationship with another.185 “This
instrumental description,” DeMott concluded, “is the only general
assertion about fiduciary obligation that can be sustained.”186 For
DeMott, as for Weinrib and Frankel, discretion is a necessary condition
before a fiduciary relationship can arise.187
In 1991, Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman wrote an influential
article analyzing the character of the fiduciary relationship.188 Although
they approach the subject from an economic perspective, they conclude
that the fiduciary relationship is characterized by discretionary control.189
In their view, fiduciary relationships entail a beneficiary entrusting a
fiduciary with management and control over an asset.190 Cooter and
Freedman have a narrow view of discretion because, in their view, the
179. Id.
180. Id. at 809.
181. Id. at 809 n.47 (“The term ‘power’ here means an ability to make changes that affect
the entrustor.”).
182. Id. at 809.
183. FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 6; id. at 25 (“To perform their services, fiduciaries must be
entrusted with various amounts of valuable assets and various degrees of discretion (power).”).
Elsewhere in the book, Frankel appears to recognize that advisors without discretionary authority
also can be fiduciaries, but with less onerous duties imposed. See id. at 9.
184. DeMott, supra note 33, at 915.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 901 (“If the relationship, as the parties structure it, does not confer discretion on
the ‘fiduciary,’ then his actions are not subject to the fiduciary constraint.”).
188. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37.
189. See id. at 1046.
190. Id. at 1046–47.
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fiduciary controls a particular asset, such as cash, stock, land, a patent or
copyright, or valuable information.191 Thus, their description omits
relationships where an agent has discretion over the principal’s affairs but
not over tangible or intangible property.192
These writers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s set the table for a
newer generation of scholars, who advance the discretionary authority
thesis. Gordon Smith maintains that there are three core requirements of
a fiduciary relationship.193 One of those requirements is that the fiduciary
exercise discretion over a resource belonging to the principal.194 Smith
explains that non-fiduciary contracts also entail discretion, but the
discretion vested in a contracting party is discretion over how to perform
a contract.195 What makes a fiduciary special is the fiduciary’s discretion
over critical resources of the principal.196 According to Smith, this
additional measure of discretion is what justifies placing heightened
duties on fiduciaries as opposed to other contracting parties.197
Henry Smith also views discretion as central to fiduciary
relationships. Henry Smith, however, rejects Gordon Smith’s limitation
that discretion must be over a critical resource.198 According to Henry
Smith, fiduciary relationships are not limited to those where one has
discretion over a property interest or another critical resource.199 Henry
Smith uses the example of physicians as fiduciaries, explaining that
fiduciary rules should apply to physicians who profit from a physician–
patient relationship that does not involve informed consent.200 Matthew
Harding subscribes to this view as well, stating that “it seems [] plausible

191. Id. at 1048 n.6.
192. The literature is not monolithic. Some writers recognize that fiduciary relationships are
not limited to cases of discretionary authority. In 1981, J.C. Shepherd wrote that the fiduciary
relationship had not been properly defined. SHEPHERD, supra note 161, at 4. He concluded that a
person can create a fiduciary obligation by offering to give advice in a particular manner. Id. at
28–29.
193. Smith, supra note 37, at 1402.
194. Id. The other requirements are the fiduciary acting on behalf of the principal and
exercising discretion over a critical resource of the principal. Id.
195. Id. at 1403.
196. Id. at 1448.
197. Id.
198. Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 279.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 280. It is unclear whether Henry Smith would consider physicians who act as
advisors to be fiduciaries. It seems not because he refers to fiduciary discretion as fundamental to
the fiduciary relationship. See id. at 275, 278.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/1
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 38

30
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Laby: Advisors as Fiduciaries

2020]

ADVISORS AS FIDUCIARIES

983

to assert that fiduciary discretion is a necessary condition of a fiduciary
relationship, even if it is not a sufficient one.”201
In their book, Fiduciaries of Humanity, Evan Criddle and Evan FoxDecent make a similar claim in the public law context.202 Criddle and
Fox-Decent argue that the relationship between the state and its subjects
is fiduciary in nature.203 Fundamental to the structure of fiduciary
relationships, they conclude, is that one party (the fiduciary) has
discretionary authority over the legal or practical interests of another (the
principal).204 The fiduciary is authorized to make choices on the
principal’s behalf in the absence of specific instructions.205 Criddle and
Fox-Decent cite examples of discretionary power that include an agent’s
power to contract on a principal’s behalf and an attorney’s power to
present claims and defenses on a client’s behalf.206 At the end of the book,
Criddle and Fox-Decent briefly discuss financial advisors as fiduciaries;
this Article addresses their discussion in Section II.A.3 below.
In a 2014 collection of papers on the fiduciary obligation, scholars
from seven countries presented various approaches to the fiduciary
relationship.207 Although the papers have little in common, a persistent
theme is that fiduciaries have discretion over their principals’ assets or
affairs. In his contribution, the Honorable Justice James Edelman
explains that in Australia, discretion is a critical feature of fiduciary
relationships.208 A fiduciary relationship is one where the fiduciary acts
on another’s behalf “in the exercise of a power or discretion” which will
affect the other person’s interest either legally or practically.209 Joshua
Getzler explains that courts in the United Kingdom tend to impose
fiduciary duties when one party has continuing authority or power over
another.210 Historically, according to Getzler, before a fiduciary duty
201. Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Relationships, Fiduciary Law, and Trust, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 58, 67.
202. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 3, at 18; see also Evan Fox-Decent, The
Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259, 259 (2005) (exploring the
“deeply fiduciary” nature of the relationship between a sovereign and its subjects).
203. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 3, at 31.
204. Id. at 18.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also Fox-Decent, supra note 202, at 300 (“The kind of discretionary power in
play is one that implies a measure of control over the interests of another, such as a trustee’s
control over the disposition of an estate, or a managing director’s control over the direction a
company takes.”).
207. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3.
208. James Edelman, The Role of Status in the Law of Obligations: Common Callings,
Implied Terms, and Lessons for Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW, supra note 3, at 22, 25.
209. Id. (quoting Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, 76 (Austl.)).
210. Getzler, supra note 33, at 43.
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would arise, a person must have continuous control over another’s assets
or affairs and be accountable for those assets.211
Paul Miller has written that a fiduciary relationship is a distinctive
type of legal relationship.212 He defines it as a relationship where “one
party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power over the significant
practical interests of another” party.213 According to Miller, possession
of discretionary power over the practical interests of the principal is the
“essential characteristic” of all fiduciary relationships.214 Miller provides
examples of discretion, such as entering into legally binding
arrangements for another; acquiring, investing, using, administering, or
alienating property for another; and making decisions relating to health
and personal welfare for another.215 Such exercise of discretionary
authority presumably would not include providing advice when the
advice neither binds the principal nor alters her legal position. Miller
directly addresses advisory services, and this Article discusses his views
below.
Hanoch Dagan and Sharon Hannes, Israeli scholars, focus on financial
fiduciaries. They, too, regard discretionary authority as essential to
fiduciary status.216 Dagan and Hannes explain that financial fiduciaries
must be sensitive to the incentive structures inherent in the activity of
managing others’ money, which they say implies a discretionary
authority particularly susceptible to carelessness and abuse.217 Irit Samet,
who espouses a Kantian view of fiduciary loyalty, believes that the
juridical duty of loyalty applies only when the fiduciary exercises
discretion.218 “The whole point” of the fiduciary relationship, she writes,
referencing Cooter and Freedman, is to allow an expert to exercise
discretion in situations that cannot be defined with precision in
advance.219 Lionel Smith, a Canadian private law scholar and an expert
on trust law, also believes that discretion is a necessary feature of
fiduciary relationships.220 Lionel Smith writes: “[O]ne of the core
features of the fiduciary relationship is that the fiduciary always holds
211. Id.
212. Miller, supra note 3, at 69.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 90.
215. Id. at 71.
216. Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The Law of Financial
Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 3, at 91–92.
217. Id.
218. Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 132, 135.
219. Id. (citing Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1046).
220. Smith, Can We Be Obliged, supra note 3, at 154.
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discretionary powers for the benefit of the beneficiary.”221 Lionel Smith
further explains that fiduciary law is needed only “where there are
discretionary powers (including the giving of advice).”222 I address
Lionel Smith’s reference to advice below.
It cannot be overemphasized that these scholars view discretion as a
necessary condition for a fiduciary relationship to arise. Gordon Smith
and Jordan C. Lee write: “[T]he grant of discretion in fiduciary
relationships is not merely an artifact of bounded rationality, but a crucial
part of the bargain.”223 Miller states: “The Court in Galambos has thus
clearly resolved that discretionary power is an essential characteristic of
all fiduciary relationships.”224
Several writers appear to take a more relaxed view of discretion,
indicating that discretion is a sufficient but perhaps not a necessary
feature of fiduciary relationships. Robert Sitkoff, who espouses an
economic view of fiduciary obligations, suggests that discretion is a
sufficient condition for a fiduciary relationship to arise.225 Certain
categories of professionals, he writes, such as trustees, guardians, agents,
and directors have the kind of discretionary power to affect a principal’s
welfare.226 As a result, these individuals are fiduciaries.227 Ethan Leib and
Stephen Galoob insist that “[a] fiduciary relationship traditionally
emerges in contexts where one person (the fiduciary) has discretionary
power over the assets or legal interests of another (the beneficiary).”228
Leib and Galoob, therefore, do not necessarily exclude individuals or
firms that lack discretion as fiduciaries.229 Most writers discussed in this
Id.
Id. at 154 n.62.
Smith & Lee, supra note 172, at 631.
Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 263 (2011).
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 197, 200.
226. Id.
227. Id. Lionel Smith writes that a fiduciary duty applies in any situation where “one person
holds authority to make discretionary decisions” that affect another person’s legal status. Smith,
Can We Be Obliged, supra note 3, at 148. He adds a second characteristic, namely, that the
discretion must be given under a proper grant of authority to another to manage her affairs. Id.
This language indicates that discretion is sufficient for a fiduciary relationship but perhaps not
necessary. Later in the same paper, however, Smith suggests that discretion is a necessary feature,
without saying so explicitly. See id. at 154. He writes that a core feature of the fiduciary
relationship “is that the fiduciary always holds discretionary powers for the benefit of the
beneficiary.” Id.
228. Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Essay, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125
YALE L.J. 1820, 1825 (2016) (emphasis added).
229. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Loyalty, Inside and Out, 92 S. CAL.
L. REV. 69, 119–20 (2018) (discussing applicability of fiduciary duties to those engaged in
advisory activities).
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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Section, however, believe that discretion is a necessary condition of a
fiduciary relationship.
Although the discretionary authority view is pervasive in the literature
on fiduciary relationships, there are some skeptics. In critiquing Miller’s
approach, Julian Velasco argues that, as a practical matter, the
discretionary authority approach is an inaccurate descriptive account of
fiduciary relationships.230 Velasco argues that although discretionary
authority may be a paradigmatic form of fiduciary power, it is not a
necessary component.231 Velasco, however, appears to believe that all
fiduciaries exercise the beneficiary’s legal capacity. A purely advisory
relationship, however, seems to contradict Velasco’s claims.
Similarly, Evan Criddle has stated that although a person may be a
fiduciary if she holds discretionary power, it does not follow that a person
must hold discretionary authority to qualify as a fiduciary.232 In Criddle’s
view, “[A] party is a fiduciary if she has been entrusted with power over
another party’s legal or practical interests.”233 According to Criddle,
power is the ability “to dictate how another’s legal rights or powers will
be exercised” and would include an “investment adviser.”234 However, a
purely advisory relationship, where the advisor has no ability to dictate
how another will exercise his rights, seems to contradict Criddle’s
approach.
Another academic commentator to question the discretionary
authority view is Robert Flannigan.235 When writing about advice by
lawyers, Flannigan states that discretion is not the “essential criterion or
determinant” for fiduciary accountability.236 Legal advice, according to
Flannigan, does not involve the exercise of discretion, yet it can be
compromised by a conflict of interest or improper benefits.237 Velasco,
Criddle, and Flannigan have laid the foundation of explaining the
drawbacks to the discretionary authority approach, which is the subject
of the next subsection.
2. The Challenge to the Discretionary Authority View
Although the discretionary authority view may describe certain
fiduciary relationships, it does not adequately describe all fiduciary
230. Velasco, supra note 3, at 83, 86.
231. Id. at 83–84, 86.
232. Criddle, supra note 3, at 1036.
233. Id. (emphasis omitted).
234. Id. at 1037.
235. See Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Mechanics, 14 CANADIAN LABOUR & EMP. L.J. 25, 38–
39 (2008).
236. Id. at 38.
237. Id. at 38–39.
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relationships and is therefore inadequate as a descriptive theory of
fiduciary duties.238 Part I demonstrated that many courts conclude that
advisors are fiduciaries although they lack discretion over the principal’s
assets or affairs. Thus, to the extent that the discretionary authority view
holds that discretion is a necessary feature to form a fiduciary
relationship, the approach must be erroneous. Many advisors lack
discretion but are nonetheless considered fiduciaries. A weaker form of
the discretionary authority view, whereby discretion is sufficient but not
necessary to form a fiduciary relationship, might be supportable. The
dominant view held by fiduciary scholars, however, is that discretion is
an essential component of fiduciary relationships. In that regard, the
approach is too reductionist and must be reconsidered.
The discretionary authority approach fails from a normative
perspective as well. There is no essential link between discretion over a
principal’s assets or affairs and the imposition of the duties of loyalty and
care—no reason discretion and the fiduciary obligation are necessarily
yoked together.239 To support the discretionary authority approach, there
must be some reason that discretion, and not some other relational
characteristic, must give rise to the duties of loyalty and care—the
essential duties imposed on fiduciaries. One can imagine arguments that
other relational characteristics, such as holding property on another’s
behalf or exercising influence over another’s affairs, could also give rise
to fiduciary duties. The challenge for those who promote the
discretionary authority approach is to explain why discretion, as opposed
to other relational qualities, is necessary before a fiduciary relationship
can arise.
In fact, one might argue that those who favor the discretionary
authority approach have it backwards. Instead of a fiduciary necessarily
having discretionary power over a principal, the fiduciary duty helps
ensure that a principal is able to maintain discretion over her own affairs.
A fundamental precept of the law of agency is that the agent (the
fiduciary) acts subject to the principal’s control—not the other way
around.240 Alice Woolley explains that not only does a lawyer lack
238. This Article focuses on advisors to disprove the discretionary authority approach.
However, certain other fiduciaries, which this Article does not discuss, similarly lack discretion.
For example, a single director on a multi-director board lacks discretion over the corporation, its
property, or its affairs. Only the board acting as a whole has such power. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (2019). Yet, a single director is most certainly a fiduciary. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 5. A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939). The Author thanks Lyman Johnson for this example.
239. See SHEPHERD, supra note 161, at 87 (arguing that the discretionary authority approach
“tells us nothing about how the duty is attached to the fiduciary” and without this connection,
“what we are left with is a theory which is descriptive, not analytic”).
240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Although an agent
can have power to affect the legal rights and duties of a principal, the very definition of “agency”
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discretion over her client’s affairs, a lawyer has a legal and ethical
obligation to leave decision-making authority in the client’s hands.241 The
structure of the attorney–client relationship is designed to enable a client
to exercise discretion, not to enable the lawyer to exercise discretion on
the client’s behalf.242 Similarly, J.E. Penner refers to advisory fiduciaries,
such as lawyers, as “epistemic authorities.”243 They do not undertake
transactions on a principal’s behalf; they advise a principal based on their
expertise so that the principal can decide what to do after becoming
informed about the effects of a particular body of knowledge.244
One way to reconcile the discretionary authority view of fiduciary
relationships with the advisors discussed in Part I is to define discretion
broadly enough to encompass the giving of advice. Most advisors employ
some measure of what one potentially could call “discretion” in
formulating their advice, particularly if the advice is prospective. A
capacious definition of discretion, which would accommodate advisory
services, however, is not what most fiduciary scholars have in mind when
they refer to a fiduciary’s discretionary authority.245 Rather, they have in
mind discretion that entails power or authority over an asset, or over the
posits that the agent acts subject to the principal’s control. See id. cmt. c (“The person represented
has a right to control the actions of the agent.”).
241. Woolley, supra note 125, at 312; see also W. Bradley Wendel, Understanding the
Complex Loyalty of Lawyers: Dual-Commission, Governance Mandate, and Intrinsic-Limit
Analyses 20 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Lawyers are fundamentally
technicians, retained by their clients for their expertise in working with complex legal doctrines—
again, with the end of facilitating the autonomy of clients to act on their own interests.”). This
principle was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
In that case, the defendant, facing the death penalty in a homicide case, insisted on presenting a
defense that lacked all credibility and would likely result in conviction and the death penalty. In
contrast, his lawyer believed his client potentially could avoid the death penalty by conceding
guilt and arguing at the penalty phase that the death penalty was unwarranted. Id. at 1505.
Although the lawyer may have been strategically correct, the Court held that the decision to
litigate ultimately rests with the client. Id. at 1509.
242. Woolley, supra note 125, at 288.
243. J.E. Penner, Distinguishing Fiduciary, Trust, and Accounting Relationships, 8 J.
EQUITY 202 (2014), 2014 AJEQT LEXIS *14, *12.
244. Id.
245. One exception is J.E. Penner, who includes the exercise of judgment as part of the
exercise of discretion. Id. at *10. Accordingly, Penner also recognizes that advisors can be
fiduciaries by virtue of giving advice. Id. Penner writes: “[I]n the case of an advisory fiduciary,
such as a solicitor giving legal advice to her client, there may be more than one course of action
open to the client, and in giving proper advice, the solicitor will have to exercise judgment . . . in
providing that advice.” Id. According to Penner, the better word for exercising these particular
powers is “judgment,” not “discretion,” but the literature refers to “discretion” and
“‘discretionary’ powers,” and so he uses that formulation. Id. at *10–11. In this Article’s view,
however, the disagreement between Penner and most others espousing a discretionary authority
approach runs deeper. As explained in the text, most commentators view a strong form of
discretionary authority to be an essential feature of fiduciary relationships.
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principal’s affairs, such that the fiduciary can change the principal’s legal
or practical position without the principal’s prior acquiescence.246
Fiduciary scholars supporting the discretionary authority approach are
clear about their views. The general idea, as discussed, is that a fiduciary
has authority over the legal or practical interests of a principal. Weinrib
writes that “the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of discretion,
and . . . this discretion must be capable of affecting the legal position of
the principal.”247 Gordon Smith insists that the distinguishing feature of
a fiduciary “is that a fiduciary exercises discretion with respect to a
critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.”248 Miller has explained
that the fiduciary “stands in substitution for the beneficiary or a
benefactor in exercising a legal capacity that is ordinarily derived from
the beneficiary or benefactor’s legal personality.”249 These accounts of
discretion are similar to the definition of discretion in the U.S. federal
securities laws, which describes whether an investment account is
considered discretionary or nondiscretionary. An advisor exercises
discretion if she is authorized to determine which securities to buy or sell
for an account or makes decisions about which securities to buy or sell.250
It is this strong form of discretion that promoters of the discretionary
authority approach have in mind.
3. Addressing the Challenge Posed by Advice
Several fiduciary scholars concede that advisors pose a challenge to
the discretionary authority view. Paul Miller and Lionel Smith recognize
that advisors pose a problem for their analysis, and Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent address whether advice can fit into their structure.
Thus, it is profitable to study the challenge as they see it—and their
replies—to determine if the discretionary authority approach can
withstand the challenge posed by advice giving.

246. See Weinrib, supra note 173, at 4.
247. Id.
248. Smith, supra note 37, at 1403; see also Smith & Lee, supra note 172, at 610–11 (“We
contend that the grant of discretion in fiduciary relationships is not merely an artifact of human
weakness, but a crucial part of the fiduciary bargain.”).
249. Miller, supra note 3, at 70–71.
250. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(35) (2018). In practice, the
client gives the advisor authority akin to a power of attorney to trade on the client’s behalf without
checking with the advisor first. See Seth E. Lipner & Lisa A. Catalano, The Tort of Giving
Negligent Investment Advice, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 663, 667 n.12 (2009) (“In a discretionary
account, the investment advisor holds power of attorney and makes the investment decisions. In
a non-discretionary account, the advisor makes recommendations and provides advice, but the
investor makes the final decision on whether to buy, sell or hold a particular security.”).
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Let us start with Miller,251 who begins his analysis of advisors by
comparing them to trustees. Miller states that many advisory
relationships are characterized by trust and confidence.252 Miller then
asks why one should not conclude that advisors, in general, are
fiduciaries.253 He answers this question by stating that one should not
draw this conclusion because it is not true.254 Under Miller’s view,
“[A]dvisers are not fiduciaries by virtue of giving advice.”255 They are
only fiduciaries, he says, “where they exercise discretionary power over
the practical interests of their clients.”256 Miller thus challenges himself
to demonstrate that advisors are not fiduciaries by virtue of advice giving.
To support the claim that advisors are not fiduciaries, Miller
references an article by Jill Fisch, entitled Fiduciary Duties and the
Analyst Scandals.257 Fisch, however, does not state that advisors are not
fiduciaries. Rather, Fisch discusses whether broker-dealers (not
investment advisors) are considered fiduciaries to their clients. She
explains that the law distinguishes between brokers and advisors and
imposes fiduciary duties on the latter but not the former.258 When Miller
concludes that advisors are not fiduciaries, perhaps he is referring to
broker-dealers in their advice-giving capacity. But this is only half of the
story: regardless of how the law treats broker-dealers, investment
advisors—a separate group of regulated professionals—are always
considered fiduciaries under federal law, regardless of whether they
exercise discretion over client accounts.259
Next, Miller relies on the Canadian Supreme Court case of
Hodgkinson v. Simms260 to support the claim that an advisory relationship
is not inherently fiduciary.261 A better reading of Hodgkinson is that
advisory relationships are not necessarily fiduciary. Miller quotes
Hodgkinson, which states that for an advisory relationship to be fiduciary,
“there must be something more than a simple undertaking by one party

251. See Miller, supra note 3, at 83–84 (discussing advisors as fiduciaries).
252. Id. at 83.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 84.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 83 n.72.
258. Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 1094–
95 (2007) (“In the context of financial professionals, the law has traditionally drawn a line
between investment advisers and broker-dealers, imposing broad fiduciary obligations only upon
the former.”).
259. See supra Section I.B.2.
260. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 (Can.).
261. Miller, supra note 3, at 83 & n.73.
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to provide information and execute orders for the other.”262 What did the
Canadian Supreme Court mean by “something more”? The court was
explicit that “something more” can simply mean trust, confidentiality, or
complexity, and not necessarily discretionary authority.263 Thus,
according to Hodgkinson, an advisory relationship can be fiduciary in the
presence of trust, confidentiality, or complexity, where the advisee
reasonably expects the advisor to act in the client’s best interest,
regardless of whether the advisor has discretion over the client’s
account.264 An advisory relationship characterized by trust is precisely
what this Article contemplates with respect to advisors who are
fiduciaries, as explained in Part III.
Finally, Miller returns to the example of broker-dealers and
investment advisors in the United States, discussed by Fisch, to support
his claim that discretion is essential for fiduciary relationships.265 In his
discussion, however, Miller focuses on brokers and ignores investment
advisors. Under United States law, broker-dealers and investment
advisors are two different groups of financial services professionals
regulated under different statutes, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934266
(for brokers) and the IAA267 (for advisors). Like investment advisors,
broker-dealers often give advice, but brokers are excluded from IAA
coverage as long as they meet certain conditions.268 Brokers typically are
not considered fiduciaries, but investment advisors are fiduciaries.269
As Miller has said—and I agree—when brokers have discretion over
a customer account, the normal rule changes and brokers are held to a
fiduciary standard. However, as outlined in Section I.B.3 above, even
262. Id. at 83 (quoting Hodgkinson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 410).
263. Hodgkinson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 410 (“There are, however, other advisory relationships
where, because of the presence of elements such as trust, confidentiality, and the complexity and
importance of the subject matter, it may be reasonable for the advisee to expect that the advisor
is in fact exercising his or her special skills in that other party’s best interests, unless the contrary
is disclosed.”).
264. Miller also quotes the Hodgkinson dissent to support his claim. Miller, supra note 3, at
83 & n.75. First, the dissent refers to the “ceding . . . of effective power” which is not the same as
power to affect the legal or practical interests of another. Hodgkinson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 466
(Sopinka & McLachin, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the key feature of an advisory relationship that
gives rise to fiduciary duties is the “ceding . . . of effective power”). Second, although the dissent
lends some support to Miller’s claims, the majority supports this Article’s argument.
265. Miller, supra note 3, at 84.
266. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78qq (2018)).
267. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-18c (2018)).
268. Id. § 202(a)(30)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C); see supra note 81.
269. SEC Rule Regulation Best Interest has enhanced the duties placed on broker-dealers,
but the SEC stopped short of deeming broker-dealers to be fiduciaries. See Regulation Best
Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,322 (July 12, 2019)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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brokers that lack discretion are considered fiduciaries when their advisory
role becomes prominent.270 Thus, for brokers, discretion is a relevant
consideration, but it is not the sole determinant of fiduciary status. And
as explained in Part I, under federal law, investment advisors, regardless
of whether they have discretion, are always considered fiduciaries to their
clients.271 Consequently, for many advisors, discretion is not a relevant
consideration with respect to fiduciary status.
Lionel Smith, whose work is discussed above, also recognizes that
advice presents a challenge for the discretionary authority view of
fiduciary duties.272 Although Smith subscribes to the discretionary
authority approach, he also recognizes that advisors are fiduciaries and
dwells on how this might be possible.273
Smith attempts to fold advice into his account of discretionary power
by claiming that giving advice is tantamount to control. Smith states that
the duty of loyalty arises in “true advisory situations, where one person
undertakes to advise another person to help that other person make their
own decisions.”274 In both situations (holding legal powers and giving
advice), Smith states that “one person holds some control over another
person, but holds that control on behalf of and for the benefit of the other
person.”275 Moreover, Smith has characterized an advisory relationship
as one where there has been a “partial transfer of autonomy.”276 Smith
writes, “If . . . the advisor has effective power over the advisee’s
decision-making process, there is a partial transfer of autonomy just as in
the case of Hohfeldian powers.”277 He states that advice entails an
exercise of judgment and concludes that “[t]he giving of advice is a
process that involves judgement, just as does the decision whether and
how to use a legal or Hohfeldian power.”278
But there is no reason to conclude that a person acting in an advisory
capacity “holds some control” over another. Similarly, there is no reason
to conclude that an advisor has effective power over an advisee’s
decision-making process. And although both advice giving and the
exercise of legal powers involve judgment, it is a logical fallacy to claim
that advice giving is tantamount to exercising legal powers.
270. See supra Section I.B.3.
271. See supra Section I.B.2.
272. Smith, Can We Be Obliged, supra note 3, at 157; Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra
note 3, at 618.
273. Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 3, at 618–19.
274. Smith, Can We Be Obliged, supra note 3, at 148.
275. Id.
276. Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 3, at 618.
277. Id.; see also Velasco, supra note 3, at 88 (suggesting that in some cases, trusted advisors
may have great influence and, therefore, effective control—de facto power—over their advisees).
278. Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 3, at 618.
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The mere provision of advice does not connote control over another.
In some cases, an advisor may exercise effective control over an advisee.
But in many instances, an advisor will enumerate several possible courses
of action and explain the advantages and disadvantages of each. Advice
may influence a client’s deliberative process, but the client is free to make
her own decision. Moreover, the advisor may be acting for the advisee’s
benefit, but that hardly amounts to control. To the contrary, providing
advice can be viewed as a way to allow a client—not the advisor—to
exercise discretion in choosing among several courses of action after
learning about the merits of each. As discussed above, the structure of an
advisory relationship can also be seen as a way to enable a client to
maintain control over her affairs, as opposed to ceding control or
discretion to the advisor.279
Lionel Smith seems to concede that advisors pose an unanswerable
challenge to the discretionary authority approach. It is clear, he writes,
that some fiduciaries do not have strict legal or Hohfeldian powers.280
Instead, they merely give advice without the power to bind their
beneficiaries.281 Smith places certain lawyers, investment advisors, real
estate agents, and physicians in this category.282 He cites to authority,
supporting the point that many fiduciary duty cases arise in an advisory
context.283 Smith concludes that advice must be given in the best interest
of the advisee, and courts do not hesitate to employ the panoply of
fiduciary rules to the advisory context.284 On these points, this Article
agrees with Smith entirely.
Finally, recall briefly Fiduciaries of Humanity, where Criddle and
Fox-Decent argue that fiduciary relationships arise when the fiduciary
has discretionary authority over the legal or practical interests of the
principal.285 Near the end of the book, the authors take up financial
advisors, who lack discretionary authority over client assets.286 Criddle
and Fox-Decent maintain that advisors have “factual power” to influence
their clients’ decisions but not legal authority to make the decisions.287 In
light of the clients’ dependence and vulnerability, Criddle and FoxDecent claim that advisors have “factual discretionary power” over a
client’s interests.288 It is unclear, however, exactly what “factual
279. See Woolley, supra note 125, at 288.
280. Smith, Can We Be Obliged, supra note 3, at 157; Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra
note 3, at 618.
281. Smith, Can We Be Obliged, supra note 3, at 157.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 157 & n.75.
284. Id.
285. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 3, at 18.
286. Id. at 332–33.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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discretionary power” means. One possibility is that the clients always
follow their advisors’ advice. But Criddle and Fox-Decent do not argue
for this definition.
In any case, “factual discretionary power” appears to be a far distance
from the authors’ earlier account of discretion, which entails making
choices on a principal’s behalf without specific instructions. If Criddle
and Fox-Decent want to fit advice into a definition of factual
discretionary power, and thereby into their earlier view of discretionary
authority, they will have to amend their earlier definition. An overly
broad definition of discretion, however, would be inconsistent with most
scholars’ view of discretion as the ability to alter a principal’s legal or
practical position.
Miller, Smith, and Criddle and Fox-Decent all seem to recognize that
advisors pose a challenge to the discretionary authority view of fiduciary
duties. Their attempts to square the activity of advisors with the
discretionary authority approach, however, are ultimately unsuccessful.
B. Fiduciary Justification
As explained in the previous Section, the discretionary authority
approach does not adequately explain who is a fiduciary and when
fiduciary duties arise. This Section explains the implications of
deficiencies in the discretionary authority approach for the standard
justification for imposing fiduciary duties. A common justification for
imposing fiduciary duties is to control a fiduciary’s discretion and protect
the principal from the harms of misappropriation, theft, and self-dealing
that can occur if the fiduciary exercises discretion improperly. But if
discretion is not a necessary feature of fiduciary relationships, then this
justification is not always applicable and there must be other reasons to
impose fiduciary duties. This Section briefly examines the argument that
fiduciary duties are justified by the need to control the fiduciary’s
discretion and concludes that the justification is incomplete.
Many writers link the justification for fiduciary duties to fiduciary
status. If fiduciary status arises when an individual or firm exercises
discretion over a principal’s assets or affairs, a natural question is why
discretion gives rise to fiduciary duties. A standard reply is that discretion
can be abused to harm the principal and thus must be controlled.
Imposing fiduciary duties is one way to control the pernicious side of
discretion. Fiduciary duties control the discretion that principals grant to
their agents.
Many writers who view discretion as a necessary feature of fiduciary
relationships also articulate a justification for fiduciary duties based on
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controlling that very discretion.289 In Weinrib’s classic article, he
provides a justification for fiduciary duties, which followed from the
criteria used to determine when a fiduciary relationship arises.290 Recall
Weinrib’s criteria: the fiduciary exercises discretion, and the discretion is
capable of affecting the principal’s legal position.291 Weinrib explains
that the principal’s interests can be affected by the manner in which the
fiduciary uses its discretion.292 As a result, Weinrib writes, “The fiduciary
obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the control of this discretion.”293
Deborah DeMott’s instrumental view of the fiduciary obligation is that it
is a device that allows the law to respond to a variety of situations where
one person’s discretion must be controlled.294
Similarly, Tamar Frankel writes that the “main purpose” of fiduciary
law is to prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing property
or power entrusted to them.295 In an earlier writing, Frankel explains why
a grant of discretionary authority leads one to worry about abuse, which
289. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1048 (explaining that both the fiduciary
duty of loyalty and the fiduciary duty of care are mechanisms to control discretion); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982)
(explaining that fiduciary duties are socially optimal penalties that enable parties to capture the
benefits obtained from delegating authority while also constraining the fiduciary from taking
advantage of the principal or otherwise furthering the fiduciary’s interests as opposed to the
principal’s); Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis
of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 215
(quoting Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039,
1049 (2011)) (explaining that fiduciary duties are necessary due to the potential for abuse inherent
in the structure of agency relationships); Ribstein, supra note 7, at 232 (2005) (stating that
fiduciary duties are justified where other devices for “controlling discretion” are likely to fail);
Sitkoff, supra note 225, at 207 (explaining that the fiduciary duty, necessary to guard against
abuse, is consistent with the agency model, or agency-cost model, of fiduciary relationships);
Smith, supra note 198, at 263 (explaining that the justification of fiduciary law as countering
opportunism is historically an outgrowth of equity).
290. See Weinrib, supra note 173, at 4, 7.
291. Id. at 4.
292. Id.
293. Id. Weinrib, like Miller and Smith, seeks to include advisors in fiduciary relationships.
When referring to classic fiduciaries, he refers to an agent who bargains or advises, as opposed to
a “middleman.” Id. at 3–4. The former has a “leeway” for the exercise of judgment. Id. According
to Weinrib, a principal necessarily does not control a fiduciary in any meaningful way. Id. at 4.
As a result, the principal’s interests can be affected by, and are dependent on, the fiduciary’s
exercise of discretion. Id. Weinrib then takes his analysis one step further and claims that fiduciary
duties only arise when the fiduciary exercises discretion and the discretion can affect the
principal’s legal position. It is this last criterion that removes nondiscretionary advisors from
Weinrib’s criteria and makes the criteria inconsistent with the caselaw.
294. DeMott, supra note 33, at 915.
295. FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 108. Fiduciary relationships are hazardous to those who
repose trust because fiduciaries can misappropriate entrusted property, fail to perform their
services with care, or fail to follow the principal’s directives. Id. at 26.
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is then addressed by the fiduciary obligation.296 The purposes for which
a fiduciary is permitted to use delegated power, she writes, is narrower
than the purposes for which he is capable of using that power.297 As a
result, the fiduciary can use the broad grant of power to benefit herself at
the principal’s expense. Fiduciary duties are a substitute for monitoring
the fiduciary’s exercise of her powers because monitoring can be
expensive and onerous.298
The view that fiduciary duties are justified to control discretion is
well-developed in the literature.299 This justification is incomplete,
however, because as shown in Part I, discretion is not a universal feature
of fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary relationships arise in the context of
advisors who lack discretion. The advisors discussed in Part I lack the
ability to change the principal’s legal or practical position. One might
claim that these advisors have discretion in the loose sense that they
exercise judgment when providing advice, but exercising judgment is not
the same as possessing discretionary authority over a principal’s assets or
affairs. As a result, the justification for fiduciary duties cannot be limited
to controlling discretionary authority. If controlling discretionary
authority were the sole justification, there would be no reason to impose
fiduciary duties on advisors who lack discretionary authority. There must
be something else at stake, a better reason that justifies fiduciary duties
for advisors. Part III provides the justification.
III. JUSTIFYING ADVISORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Part I explained that advisors, including advisors who exercise no
discretionary authority over their clients’ assets or affairs, are often
considered fiduciaries. Part II then explained the implications of Part I
for fiduciary theory, including the deficiencies of the discretionary
authority approach and the drawback of viewing control over the
fiduciary’s discretion as the primary reason for imposing fiduciary duties.
This Part develops a justification for imposing a fiduciary duty on
certain advisors. The justification is especially important with respect to
advisors who are not otherwise considered fiduciaries. If an advisor is a
status-based or “categorical” fiduciary (such as a trustee, partner, or
lawyer), courts can impose fiduciary duties not specifically because of
the advice given but rather because the advisor is generally deemed a
fiduciary. The more difficult question I shall explore is why giving advice
296. Frankel, supra note 177, at 804.
297. Id. at 810.
298. See FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 29. More recently, Frankel writes that the assumption
underlying fiduciary law is that the principal cannot protect himself against the potential for abuse.
Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW, supra note 3, at 242, 247.
299. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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justifies imposing a fiduciary duty on an individual or firm not otherwise
considered a fiduciary.
The primary argument is that advisors are and should be considered
fiduciaries based on the trust that advisors seek from their clients and the
trust that clients repose in their advisors. Advisors seek to generate a
relationship of trust with clients. Trust leads to clients’ reliance on the
advisor and to vulnerability with respect to matters related to the advice.
An advisor’s fiduciary duty arises from the nature of the relationship
characterized by trust, reliance, and vulnerability. Imposing a fiduciary
duty aims to prevent the harm that can befall a vulnerable client and, at
the same time, it helps to promote a relationship through ensuring that the
advisor is acting in the client’s interest and not for some other reasons.
Although trust may not necessarily be an essential component of all
fiduciary relationships, it is an essential component of an advisory
relationship—and the foundation of an advisor’s fiduciary duty.300
Imposing a fiduciary duty is appropriate for many advisors. However,
not every instance of advice giving will or should lead to fiduciary
liability. It is fanciful to conclude that any and all advice offered by a
stranger on a street corner should be considered advice subject to a
fiduciary standard. There is a fine line between informal advice, which
should not be the subject of liability, and advice that should be subject to
legal redress. Thus, this Part also proposes guidance to help distinguish
when certain advice giving should lead to fiduciary liability.
A significant amount of advice is given by advisors who are otherwise
considered fiduciaries. Therefore, this Part begins with a short discussion
of advice provided by status-based fiduciaries because norms that have
developed for status-based fiduciary advisors may bear on other advisors
as well. Next, this Part moves to the more difficult case of ad hoc
fiduciary advisors and a discussion of trust, reliance, and vulnerability in
advisory relationships. This Part concludes with proposed guidance to
distinguish between informal advice giving and advice giving that creates
a fiduciary relationship.
A. Status-Based Fiduciary Advisors
Certain individuals and firms have long been recognized as statusbased or categorical fiduciaries; they are treated as fiduciaries as a matter
of law based on their status.301 Status-based fiduciaries include trustees,
partners, corporate directors, lawyers, and others.302 Their fiduciary
status is well-accepted and seldom questioned. Once an individual
becomes a trustee, for example, that person is considered a fiduciary
300. See Gold, supra note 4, at 1.
301. Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 1, 2.
302. Id. at 3.
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when acting in her trustee capacity merely as a result of her status. There
is no need to investigate whether a trustee is a fiduciary. The question is
closed based on the convention of treating trustees as fiduciaries.
One reason for placing a fiduciary duty on certain advisors is that
many individuals or firms that give advice are status-based fiduciaries. A
significant component of the work of a trustee or lawyer, for example, is
the provision of professional advice. Imposing fiduciary duties on these
individuals includes imposing fiduciary duties in the context of their
advice giving. Once one has determined that a professional is a statusbased fiduciary, it would be odd to hold that she is not a fiduciary in her
advice giving capacity, especially when the provision of advice, as we
shall see, can raise many of the concerns that the fiduciary obligation is
typically meant to address. As Julian Velasco writes, “[A]dvisers who
belong to a class that is deemed fiduciary should be presumed to be
fiduciaries.”303 Courts impose fiduciary duties in categorical fiduciary
relationships as a prophylactic measure, which takes into account the
odds of potential abuse.304
The law applicable to status-based fiduciaries may also bear on the
law applicable to ad hoc fiduciaries and on a client’s reasonable
expectations with respect to an ad hoc fiduciary.305 Courts often analyze
whether someone is an ad hoc fiduciary against a backdrop dominated by
status-based fiduciaries.306 The law applicable to status-based fiduciary
advisors may signal to other advisors what is expected of them.307 In other
words, to the extent that certain advisors are always considered
fiduciaries, this result may lead other advisees to assume that advice
giving, even if done by someone who is not a status-based fiduciary, is a
fiduciary enterprise. If advice by one trusted professional, such as a
trustee or a lawyer, is a fiduciary activity, clients may expect advice by
another trusted professional to be a fiduciary activity as well.308
303. Velasco, supra note 3, at 90.
304. See Gold, supra note 4, at 10.
305. See Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Law and Social Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 11, at 798.
306. See Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1265 (2015).
307. See Harding, supra note 201, at 72 (“One way in which fiduciary law supplies this
guidance [regarding what is implied in a principal’s trust] is via its express recognition of certain
relationship types as prima facie fiduciary in character; the relationships of trustee-beneficiary,
agent-principal, solicitor-client, and partner-partner are often given in this connection.”).
308. Empirical evidence supports this expectation. SEC-registered investment advisors owe
fiduciary duties to clients. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS 100 (2011). SEC-registered broker-dealers, who also provide advice, are not
typically considered fiduciaries. Id. Yet most people believe that similar activity, namely the
provision of investment advice, would result in the same standard of conduct. See id. at 99–100.
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This spillover effect from status-based to ad hoc fiduciaries, however,
might simply be an error in reasoning. Although it might bear on one’s
empirical expectations, it is not an independent reason to impose a
fiduciary duty on advisors who are not status-based fiduciaries.309 The
next Section develops an argument for imposing a fiduciary duty on
advisors who are not otherwise considered fiduciaries.
B. Ad Hoc Fiduciary Advisors
This Section focuses on the person or firm that provides advice and
that is not considered a status-based fiduciary, such as a bank, business
advisor, or stockbroker discussed in Part I. A justification for imposing a
fiduciary duty on these persons and firms is important because they are
more likely to be unaware that they owe a fiduciary obligation.310 The
justification developed in this Section is based on advisors’ roles and
norms of advice giving that have developed over time. When certain
individuals provide advice, they give advice in the context of a high level
of trust. Trust is often a key component of an advisory relationship. This
Section, drawing on social science literature, explains the connection
between advice and trust. It then discusses the reliance, vulnerability, and
potential abuse that can result from a relationship of trust and the
protections that fiduciary duties afford.
1. Advice and Trust
This Section first identifies the close relationship between advice and
trust. Although advising is a complex phenomenon, certain general
principles are common to most cases of advice giving. Trust is a similarly
complex phenomenon. Social science literature closely links advice and
trust, viewing advice giving as an invitation to a client to repose trust in
an advisor. Moreover, viewing an advisor as occupying a role grounded
in trust is consistent with one’s intuitions about advice as well as with
caselaw explored in this Article. If an advisor is not seeking another’s
trust, or is not at least acting as if she were seeking another’s trust, then
she is likely not engaged in advice giving.
a. Characteristics of Advice
Before describing the relationship between trust and advice, let us first
clarify some key characteristics of advice. Advice is given in a wide array
of professional and personal settings, including friendship, family,

309. Laby, supra note 8, at 751–53.
310. See Gold, supra note 4, at 11.
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healthcare, education, business, and law.311 It is given in close, personal
relationships, and in formal, institutional relationships.312 Advice is
studied in many disciplines, including communications, psychology,
business, sociology, education, and medicine.313 It is challenging,
therefore, to draw broad generalizations about advice. But there are some
well-accepted principles that are helpful in understanding the social
context of advice giving.
In explaining what advice means and its importance, social scientists
refer to advice normativity, the presentation of advice as a normative,
appropriate, or beneficial action.314 Advice is something that a recipient
should follow.315 John Heritage and Sue Sefi define advice as something
that “describes, recommends, or otherwise forwards a preferred course of
future action.”316 This normative dimension, they argue, is central to the
activity of advice giving.317
Erina MacGeorge and Lyn Van Swol synthesize the literature on
advice giving and identify seven prototypical elements: (i) a focus on the
client’s action; (ii) a focus on the future; (iii) the intention to guide the
client’s future behavior; (iv) a one-on-one communication; (v) a disparity
of expertise between advisor and client; (vi) the existence of a problem;
and (vii) the intention to help resolve the problem.318 According to
MacGeorge and Van Swol, recommendations made strictly with ulterior
motives, that lack utility, or that are harmful to an advisee, cannot be
considered prototypical advice.319 These criteria help clarify the social
norms associated with advice: Advice should be shorn of ulterior motives
(suggesting the injunction against conflicts of interest), and it must be
useful and not harmful to the client (suggesting the need for diligence).320
These norms presage the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care discussed
below.
311. Erina L. MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol, Advice Across Disciplines and Contexts, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ADVICE 3, 4 (Erina L. MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018).
312. Lisa Guntzviller, Advice Messages and Interactions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ADVICE, supra note 311, at 69.
313. MacGeorge & Van Swol, supra note 311, at 4.
314. See Guntzviller, supra note 312, at 71.
315. Id.
316. John Heritage & Sue Sefi, Dilemmas of Advice: Aspects of the Delivery and Reception
of Advice in Interactions Between Health Visitors and First-Time Mothers, in TALK AT WORK 359,
368 (Paul Drew & John Heritage eds., 1992); see also Chloe Shaw et al., Advice-Implicative
Actions: Using Interrogatives and Assessments to Deliver Advice in Mundane Conversation, 17
DISCOURSE STUD. 317, 319 (2015) (adopting the definition of advice advanced by Heritage &
Sefi); Guntzviller, supra note 312, at 71 (discussing “advice interactions”).
317. Heritage & Sefi, supra note 316, at 368.
318. MacGeorge & Van Swol, supra note 311, at 6–7.
319. Id. at 6.
320. See id. at 5–6.
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MacGeorge and Van Swol’s analysis is consistent with standard
definitions of advice. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “advise” as
“[t]o give guidance or suggestions, or state one’s opinion, to (a person,
etc.) as to the best course of action; to counsel, make recommendations
to; (also more generally) to give one’s assessment of something to (a
person), usually as a basis for making a decision.”321 As I have explained
elsewhere, the touchstone of this definition is the phrase “as to the best
course of action” for the client.322 Similarly, the word “recommend,”
embedded in the definition above, means “[t]o mention or present (a
thing, course of action) to . . . a person . . . as being desirable or
advisable.”323 Implicit is that the “thing” or “course of action” under
consideration is “desirable” or “advisable” for the client. The client,
however, often does not know whether the advice is desirable, especially
if he lacks the advisor’s expertise. Thus, the next Section turns to the trust
a client is asked to place in his advisor.
b. Trust as a Component of Advice
Trust, like advice, is complex and has a variety of meanings depending
on context. Like advice, trust is studied in a variety of disciplines and
defies generalizations.324 Broadly conceived, “Trust is an attitude that
recognizes and responds to the freedom of individuals to make
choices.”325 An advisor has the freedom to make advisory choices when
advising a client, and trust is the client’s attitudinal response that such
choices will benefit the client.326 Consistent with that understanding,
321. Advise, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2020).
322. Laby, supra note 8, at 767.
323. Recommend, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2020) (emphasis omitted).
324. See T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, The Risk-Based View of Trust: A Conceptual
Framework, 19 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 85, 86 (2004); Matthew Harding, Manifesting Trust, 29 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 246 (2009).
325. Harding, supra note 324, at 248; see also Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J.
1457, 1461 (2005) (stating that researchers have “accepted a definition of trust as a belief, attitude,
or expectation . . . that the actions or outcomes of another individual . . . will be acceptable or will
serve the actor’s interests” (quoting Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited
Effectiveness of Legalistic “Remedies” for Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG. SCI. 367, 368 (1993))); Larry
E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2001) (“Trust can be seen simply as a decision
by one person to give power over his person or property to another in exchange for a return
promise.”).
326. The freedom to make advisory choices is not the same as the discretionary authority,
which some view as necessary for a fiduciary duty to arise. As mentioned, if one defines
“discretion” so capaciously to include making advisory choices, then this Article agrees that
advisors have “discretion.” But that is not the definition of discretion employed by the writers
discussed in Part II. It appears that certain trust theorists make the same mistake about discretion
that many fiduciary theorists make. Certain trust theorists appear to insist that trust must entail
discretion. Harding, supra note 324, at 253–54. However, this Article maintains that discretion is

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 57

49
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 1

1002

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

another definition of trust is “a relationship in which one party reasonably
believes that the other party is telling the truth and will meet its
obligations.”327 Moreover, the features of advice described by
MacGeorge and Van Swol are characteristic of a trust relationship: close
personal communications, a disparity of expertise, and one person who is
meant to help another.328 These definitions demonstrate that the social
context of advice is one of trust.
Social scientists explore the interesting dynamic that occurs between
trust and advice. The philosopher Edward S. Hinchman considers the act
of advising a client as an invitation to the client to repose trust in the
advisor.329 As Hinchman explains, what makes advice different from
other speech acts is that the advisor assumes a perspective that she is
acting from a point of view to help the client, and she presumes to know
as well or better than the client what is in the client’s interest.330 As
Hinchman writes, the advisor presents herself as “adopting a perspective
on [the] advisee’s self-interest that rivals in authority for the advisee the
advisee’s own perspective.”331 An advisor invites the client to trust the
advisor’s perspective regarding the client’s interests, even if that
perspective conflicts with the client’s own perspective.332
Inviting the client to trust the advisor’s perspective to rival the client’s
own perspective is necessary and appropriate in light of the disparity of
information and expertise between most advisors and their clients. As
Richard Brooks explains, certain fiduciaries acquire special knowledge
about their principals.333 An advisor often will be privy to private and
personal information about a client.334 Sometimes, a fiduciary may have
not a necessary element of a trust relationship, just as it is not a necessary element of a fiduciary
relationship.
327. MARK FAGAN & TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY IN THE REAL WORLD 3 (2d ed.
2009); see also Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of
Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 399 (1998) (“Trust emerges when the trustor perceives that the
trustee intends to perform an action that is beneficial.”).
328. See MacGeorge & Van Swol, supra note 311, at 6–7.
329. See Edward S. Hinchman, Advising as Inviting to Trust, 35 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 355, 356
(2005).
330. Id. at 358.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 359. Advice is not the only activity that invites trust. The act of promising arguably
invites trust as well. By making a promise, the promisor invites another to trust that the promise
will be kept and, by accepting the promise, the promissee also accepts trust. DORI KIMEL, FROM
PROMISE TO CONTRACT 31 (2003). An important difference between advising and promising,
however, is that the promisor does not assume a perspective where she presumes to know as well
or better than the promissee what is in the promissee’s interest.
333. Richard R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 225, 237–38.
334. Id.
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even more knowledge about a principal than the principal has about
himself.335 Based on skill, experience, and expertise developed over
years, an advisor, Brooks suggests, is likely to have a better
understanding of how to put this knowledge to use in a way that will
benefit the client.336 The disparity described by Brooks is consistent with
Hinchman’s claim that an advisor invites the client to trust the advisor’s
perspective as rivaling the client’s own perspective.
According to Hinchman’s account then, trust serves as the foundation
of advice. The presumption inherent in advice is that the advisor gives
the client a reason to act (regardless of whether the client actually follows
the advice) by virtue of the client’s recognition that the advisor’s reason
for the client to act, and the eventual action by the client, is what the
advisor intends.337 When you advise another, “you invite him . . . to trust
your perspective on what he should do: to treat it as a direct source of
practical reasons, reasons grounded solely in your status as worthy of his
trust.”338
To further clarify the social context of advice, one can contrast the
term “advise” with other speech acts that do not invite another to repose
trust. To “convince” someone, for example, is “[t]o induce, prevail upon,
persuade.”339 Nothing in the definition of “convince” suggests that the
speaker invites another to trust, or that a relationship of trust will
develop.340 Similarly, to “persuade” means “[t]o urge successfully to do
something; to attract, induce, or entice to something or in a particular
direction.”341 To persuade suggests that the speaker is urging the recipient
to move in a particular direction, but not necessarily in a direction that
will help the recipient, which is a key element of advice. Although advice
can be a form of persuasive communication, persuasion is not always
motivated by the existence of a problem, and it does not necessarily
betoken an intention to help the recipient. In fact, persuasion can
represent an intention to benefit the persuader at the recipient’s
expense.342 The terms “advise” and “persuade” may be interchangeable
in colloquial speech (as in “I would like to advise you to repay the debt
335. Id. at 237.
336. Id. at 238; see also Amir N. Licht, Motivation, Information, Negotiation: Why Fiduciary
Accountability Cannot Be Negotiable, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note
3, at 169 (“The upshot is that fiduciary relations emerge as a legal regime in certain circumstances
in order to regulate the power that stems from information asymmetries (coupled with selfinterestedness).”).
337. Hinchman, supra note 329, at 361.
338. Id.
339. Convince, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2020).
340. Id.
341. Persuade, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2020) (emphasis omitted).
342. MacGeorge & Van Swol, supra note 311, at 7.
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you owe me!”), but such usage is sarcastic or satirical and inconsistent
with the actual meaning of the terms.343
The understanding of an advisor’s role, as seeking to help another and
inviting another to trust, conforms with one’s intuitions about advice. One
might try to persuade or convince another to do something by giving
reasons, which do not invoke trust, when one does not wish to help, and
even when one seeks to thwart the other’s interests. A person might try
to persuade or convince an adversary to act or refrain from acting in a
manner related to the scope of their adversarial relationship. A
competitor, for example, might seek to persuade her adversary from
entering a competition. By contrast, it is nonsensical to speak of the
competitor advising her adversary to refrain from entering (unless we are
using the word sarcastically). It is nonsensical because the competitor
does not intend to help her adversary and is not seeking her adversary’s
trust.
Examples of an advisor’s trusted role are ubiquitous. When a career
counselor advises a student, the counselor invites the student to trust her,
and the student trusts that she will advise based on the student’s needs
and not on some other criteria, such as what might be best for the school
or for another student. When a librarian advises a patron on a book
selection, the librarian invites the patron to trust her, and the patron trusts
the librarian to advise based on what will be a good read for the patron,
not based on the librarian’s friendship with an author, or another secret
motive. Trust is a key component of advice.
It is instructive to look again at the cases discussed in Part I where
advice is a trigger to transform a non-fiduciary relationship into a
fiduciary relationship. Part I examined those cases to demonstrate, as a
descriptive matter, that advisors are often fiduciaries, and that individuals
and firms not typically considered fiduciaries can become fiduciaries
when they act outside of their normal role and provide advice. A second
look at those cases, from a normative perspective, demonstrates that trust
is a key component of each advisory relationship.
Recall In re Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation, the auditor case.
E&Y defended the case by arguing that auditors are not fiduciaries;
Cendant replied that E&Y’s work extended to providing advice.344 In
examining the allegations that E&Y advised Cendant, the court stated that
“[t]hese allegations are sufficient for Cendant to be able to demonstrate
it reposed trust in E&Y’s superior skill and knowledge, specifically for
the benefit of Cendant.”345 The court recognized the close connection
343. See Hinchman, supra note 329, at 359 (explaining that one might use “advise” as a joke,
as an effort at coercion, or as an effort at coercion masquerading as a joke).
344. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 585, 608 (D.N.J. 2001).
345. Id. at 610.
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between advice and trust, and ultimately to the possible imposition of
fiduciary duties.
The same was true for EBC I, Inc., the underwriting case. The
complaint alleged that Goldman’s client, eToys, relied on Goldman’s
advice and, therefore, Goldman acted in a fiduciary capacity. 346 In that
case, the court focused on advice and explained that under the complaint,
the parties allegedly created their own relationship of “higher trust” that
went beyond a standard underwriting agreement and that required
Goldman to deal honestly with eToys and disclose conflicts of interest.347
This Article is not suggesting that every advisory relationship is
necessarily a relationship where a client subjectively reposes trust. (That
is why the phrase “invitation to trust” is so apt.) One can imagine an
advisory relationship between a lawyer and client, investment advisor and
client, or doctor and patient where the client or patient follows the advice
of a professional but does not subjectively trust her. The relationship,
shorn of subjective trust, is still an advisory relationship. And it is wellaccepted that trust is not an incident of every fiduciary relationship.348
Providing advice, however, invites another to trust the advisor even if the
advisee does not subjectively repose trust.349
Trust, then, is an important component of advice, and advice takes
place in the context of a trust relationship, where the advisor seeks
another’s trust and confidence. If the advisor is not seeking another’s
trust, or is not acting as if she is seeking another’s trust, her activity is
something other than advice giving. Perhaps it is mere testimony, a
command, or an attempt at persuasion. Consider the following example:
If a traveler finds himself in a village far from home and asks for the
nearest hotel, the simple answer is not advice. However, as soon as the
villager adds, “But I would not stay there. I suggest a better hotel outside
346. EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 30 (N.Y. 2005).
347. Id. at 32. The discretion theorist might point out that these examples—auditing and
underwriting—entail discretion over the practical interests of another, even if not at the point
where the fiduciary breach occurs. Putting aside the question of whether these services entailed
discretion, the essential point is that advice giving, and the attendant trust reposed in the fiduciary,
were the reasons the courts found a fiduciary relationship.
348. See Harding, supra note 201, at 65–66.
349. Trust is not all or nothing. Presumably, if a principal follows the advice of another, the
principal has placed some amount of trust in the other, even if that trust is not complete. In that
regard, this Article does not agree with Velasco’s claim that advising is not susceptible to
classification as fiduciary. Velasco, supra note 3, at 87–88. Velasco points out that advice is often
conflicted or self-referential (“what I would do if I were you”), but one is willing to hear it to get
another perspective. Id. at 87. This Article does not necessarily agree that most people expect
advice to be conflicted. Even if some do, the perceived conflict may diminish the trust the advisee
places in his advisor, but it does not eliminate it. Moreover, as discussed, conflicted advice is
often grounds for a breach of fiduciary duty claim, thereby upholding an advisee’s expectations
that advice will not be conflicted. See supra Section I.B.
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of town,” she is offering advice because she is inviting the traveler to trust
her judgment, even if the advice does not give rise to fiduciary liability,
which this Article discusses shortly. Before turning to the connection
between trust and fiduciary duty, however, I first address the vulnerability
that can arise when a client reposes trust in an advisor.
2. Trust and Vulnerability
Trust and vulnerability are cognate concepts. Most definitions of trust
stress the acceptance of a vulnerable situation where one person, the
trustor, believes that another person, the trustee, will care for the trustor’s
interests.350 A common definition of trust is “a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”351 Similar
definitions of trust are “a state involving confident positive expectations
about another’s motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing
risk”352 and “the mutual confidence that one’s vulnerabilit[y] will not be
exploited in an exchange.”353 Vulnerability is the risk of loss or adverse
outcome.354 Risk is at the core of trust and there is wide agreement across
disciplines that risk is the first of two essential conditions of trust.355 The
greater the level of vulnerability or risk that one faces, the greater the
potential for trust.356 According to some accounts, trust and vulnerability
are inseparable—without vulnerability, there is no need for trust.357
For trust to reach its full potential, it must manifest in action. This
manifestation can take several forms, such as allowing the trustee to
perform tasks on the trustor’s behalf, providing personal or confidential
information to the trustee, placing resources at the trustee’s disposal, or
changing one’s position in accordance with the trustee’s views. 358 Trust
characterized merely by attitudes or beliefs is not enough to benefit a

350. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002); Mark A.
Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, and
Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 615–16 (2001).
351. Rousseau et al., supra note 327, at 394–95 (emphasis omitted).
352. Susan D. Boon & John G. Holmes, The Dynamics of Interpersonal Trust: Resolving
Uncertainty in the Face of Risk, in COOPERATION AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 190, 194 (Robert A.
Hinde & Jo Groebel eds., 1991).
353. Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 177 (1994).
354. Das & Teng, supra note 324, at 104.
355. Rousseau et al., supra note 327, at 395.
356. Das & Teng, supra note 324, at 104; Hall, supra note 350, at 474; Hall et al., supra note
350, at 615.
357. E.g., Hall et al., supra note 350, at 615.
358. See Das & Teng, supra note 324, at 103.
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trustor.359 When one person trusts another and acts on it, the first person
gives the second the opportunity to show that the second person can be
trusted.360 The manifestation of trust played a key role in the cases
discussed in Part I. In Morris, Morris placed his trust in American Bank.
In MidAmerica Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, MidAmerica placed its
trust in Don Crow at Shearson. In Cheng, the Chengs placed confidence
in William Grace at Merrill. In EBC I, Inc., eToys trusted Goldman.
The manifestation of trust often takes the form of reliance. Many
consider reliance, along with vulnerability, to be the second essential
condition of trust.361 One person relies on another to act in a way that will
affect the first person’s interest in a positive and meaningful way.
Reliance is common in relationships with status-based fiduciaries. Clients
rely on their lawyers, partners rely on one another, and trust beneficiaries
rely on their trustees. Reliance is also common in other advisory
relationships. Recall again some of the common characteristics of advice:
a disparity of expertise between advisor and client and the intention to
help with a problem. These characteristics describe a context in which
clients rely on their advisors.
That said, not all trust relationships result in reliance. One might trust
a friend or relative but not rely on her in a way that will affect one’s
personal interests. Perhaps one is confident that he could rely on her, but
does not actually do so. Trust, however, often leads to reliance, and there
is a fine line between the two. Many trusting relationships, including
advisory relationships, can and do result in reliance, which is more likely
to occur when a client lacks the specialized skills, knowledge, or
education held by the advisor.
Once a client trusts and relies on an advisor, he becomes vulnerable
to multiple forms of abuse. Two common forms of abuse are receiving
conflicted advice and receiving ill-informed, incomplete, or erroneous
advice. Advice might be conflicted in the sense that it is motivated by an
advisor’s self-interest or her interest in benefitting a third party, and the
client may be unaware of the conflict. Or, perhaps because the client
trusts that the advisor is looking after the client’s interests, he believes it
is unnecessary to inquire.362 Even if advice is not conflicted, an advisor
might not have undertaken the requisite amount of care and diligence in
preparing the advice. As a result, the advice may be ill-considered,
imprudent, or even reckless. Again, because the client has reposed trust
in the advisor and relied on her to provide sound advice, the client may
359. Harding, supra note 201, at 60.
360. Id. at 60–61.
361. See Rousseau et al., supra note 327, at 395.
362. The client may be afraid that posing the question will offend the advisor, especially if
the relationship is a personal relationship.
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be unaware that the advice is deficient.363 Thus, although trust is
generally thought of as positive, it has a dark side. Trust builds a
relationship but, when abused, trust can also destroy a relationship. Trust
and vulnerability highlight the need for fiduciary protections, as
explained in the next Section.
3. The Need for Fiduciary Protections
The connection between trust and fiduciary duties has deep roots in
both caselaw and fiduciary law scholarship. Deborah DeMott has
surveyed dictionary definitions of the term “fiduciary” and concluded
that a fiduciary, in layman’s terms, is someone who another should be
able to trust to be loyal to the first person’s interests.364 A relationship of
trust as giving rise to fiduciary duties also appears in caselaw. 365 And
many courts characterize fiduciary relationships as relationships of trust
and confidence.366
The trust and reliance inherent in advisory relationships raise risks that
are directly addressed by the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. The duty
363. In a glance back to Part II of this Article, note that the client can rely on the advisor,
and be harmed as a result, even if the client does not give the advisor discretion over his affairs.
If an advisee gives the advisor discretionary authority over his affairs, the potential for abuse may
be even greater. However, as Part I demonstrates, discretion is not a necessary feature of an
advisory relationship marked by trust and reliance.
364. DeMott, supra note 306, at 1259.
365. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Trademark Tr. v. Wachner, 123 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding that a fiduciary relationship can arise “when one party’s superior position or
superior access to confidential information is so great as virtually to require the other party to
repose trust and confidence in the first party”); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Although the existence of fiduciary relationships
under New York law cannot be determined by recourse to rigid formulas, New York courts
typically focus on whether one person has reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby
gains a resulting superiority or influence over the first.”), rev’d on other grounds, 967 F.2d 742
(2d Cir. 1992); Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Soc’y Nat’l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ohio 1996)
(defining a fiduciary relationship as one where one person reposes confidence and trust, and the
other person acquires the resulting superiority or influence); In re Estate of Beal, 769 P.2d 150,
154 (Okla. 1989) (noting that a fiduciary relationship “exists whenever trust and confidence are
placed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another”); Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co.,
672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14 (App. Div. 1998) (discussing that to determine whether a fiduciary
relationship exists, “a court will look to whether a party reposed confidence in another and
reasonably relied on the other’s superior expertise or knowledge”); Penato v. George, 383
N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (App. Div. 1976) (“Broadly stated, a fiduciary relationship is one founded
upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.”).
366. See, e.g., Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 407 P.3d 692, 697 (Mont. 2017) (“[A]n
otherwise arms-length relationship between a lender and borrower or applicant may ripen into a
fiduciary relationship ‘of trust and confidence,’ with attendant fiduciary duties . . . .”); TBF Fin.,
LLC v. Gregoire, 118 A.3d 511, 522 (Vt. 2015) (“The close relationship of trust and confidence
necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the parties.”).
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of loyalty, among other things, addresses conflicts of interest and helps
ensure that an advisor acts in the advisee’s interests as opposed to the
advisor’s interests or those of a third party. The duty of care helps ensure
that an advisor is well-informed about the advisee and his circumstances
and has undertaken the necessary diligence to advise in a way that will
serve the advisee’s interests. Let us briefly explore what these duties
require before showing in more detail how they apply to advisors.
a. Negative and Positive Duties
In the American legal tradition, the fiduciary obligation consists of
duties of loyalty and care.367 Fiduciary relationships often risk two types
of wrongdoing: conflicts of interest, misappropriation, and theft, which
are addressed by the duty of loyalty; and neglect, indifference, and
imprudence, which are addressed by the duty of care.368 Thus, the duty of
loyalty is primarily negative, and the duty of care primarily positive.369
The duty of loyalty prohibits a fiduciary from engaging in
unauthorized harmful conduct.370 Section 78 of the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts, entitled Duty of Loyalty, is a good example. The tenor of this
provision is negative and its prohibitions are absolute, in part because of
the difficulty faced by a trustee in resisting temptation when personal
interests conflict with duty.371 The duty of loyalty prohibits a trustee from
personally engaging in transactions with the trust, such as buying trust
property, selling property to the trust, borrowing from or lending to the
trust, or exchanging property with the trust.372 Similarly, under corporate
law, the duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing transactions and
misappropriation of corporate opportunities.373 The duty of loyalty is
implemented by preventative rules that address temptations faced by
fiduciaries. These duties are negative.

367. See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 570 (1985); Horras v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 2013); CDX
Liquidating Tr. v. Venrock Assocs., 640 F.3d 209, 215 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Brook Valley VII,
Joint Venture, 496 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2007).
368. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1047.
369. For a more complete discussion, see Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in
Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75 (2004); but see In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.,
907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing Lyman P.Q. Johnson, After Enron: Remembering
Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 27 (2003)).
370. See Fiduciary Duties, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127,
129 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). For a more complete discussion of the proscriptivist approach to
the fiduciary duty of loyalty, see Galoob & Leib, supra note 229, at 80–82.
371. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
372. Id. § 78 cmt. d.
373. In re Shepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
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If the duty of loyalty is primarily negative, the duty of care is primarily
positive. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that the duty of care
requires the trustee to use “reasonable effort and diligence” in planning
the administration of the trust, making and implementing administrative
decisions, and monitoring the trust.374 The duty of care entails conducting
an appropriate investigation and obtaining information about the contents
of the trust estate and the circumstances of the trust and its
beneficiaries.375 In corporate law, the duty of care requires a director to
exercise the degree of care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise under similar circumstances.376 A failure to sufficiently
explore or evaluate alternative transactions, for example, implicates care,
not loyalty.377 As certain writers acknowledge, the point of entering into
a fiduciary relationship is for the fiduciary to take initiative on the
principal’s behalf.378 A principal, according to Daniel Markovits, engages
the fiduciary expressly because the principal is unable to handle affairs
through standard contracts.379 In this sense, Markovits explains, the
principal effectively “buys her fiduciary’s initiative.”380 Similarly, Julian
Velasco explains that what the beneficiary wants most of all is for the
fiduciary to “do[] a good job”—using her skill and diligence to further
the principal’s interests.381
374. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
375. Id. § 77 cmt. b.
376. In re Shepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. at 797.
377. See In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6623-VCN, 2013 WL 396202,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013); In re Alloy, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5626-VCP, 2011 WL 4863716,
at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011).
378. E.g., Markovits, supra note 289, at 216.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 690
(2015). According to some courts and commentators, the duty of care ranks as less important than
the duty of loyalty, or is not a fiduciary duty at all. CONAGLEN, supra note 168, at 1, 17. Common
law countries outside the United States generally do not view the duty of care as a fiduciary duty.
Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It
Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013). In Australia, for example, not all of a
fiduciary’s duties are considered fiduciary duties, and a fiduciary’s obligations to exercise the
level of care required of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances is not a fiduciary
obligation. Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 (Austl.); see CONAGLEN, supra note 168, at 17–
18. The same is true in the United Kingdom. See Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew, [1998]
Ch. 1, at 16 (Eng.). Matthew Conaglen writes that it is well-established that loyalty is the “core”
concept of the fiduciary obligation—the “defining” concept of fiduciary duty. CONAGLEN, supra
note 168, at 1. Joshua Getzler states that while affirmative acts form part of the constellation of
fiduciary duties, influential decisions of appellate courts outside of the United States hold that
there are no affirmative fiduciary duties at all. Getzler, supra note 33, at 42. Even in the United
States, some view the fiduciary duty of care as not central to the fiduciary obligation. See, e.g.,
DeMott, supra note 33, at 915 (stating that the duty of care “is not distinctively fiduciary; many
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b. Justifying the Advisor’s Fiduciary Duty
Understanding that the fiduciary duty has both negative and positive
components helps explain how the fiduciary obligation protects and
promotes advisory relationships. The previous Section argued that the
intent of an advisor’s fiduciary duty cannot be merely to curb the abuses
attendant to discretionary authority because many advisors lack such
authority. What purpose, then, is served by imposing a fiduciary duty on
advisors? The advisor’s fiduciary duty prohibits or limits some actions to
protect advisory clients, and it requires other actions to help ensure that
the advisor will do what the client desires most: provide sound advice in
the client’s best interest.
This Section begins with the duty of loyalty, which protects advisory
clients from conflicts of interest and other forms of abuse. Abuse in an
advisory relationship can take many forms. A primary concern is that an
advisor will provide conflicted advice or will appropriate, or attempt to
appropriate, a benefit for herself that should belong to the advisee.382 A
financial advisor, for example, may recommend an investment in a
mediocre business owned or controlled by that advisor herself (or a friend
or family member), instead of recommending the best possible
investment. A lawyer may provide compromised legal advice through an
undisclosed conflict or the receipt of undisclosed benefits.383 A partner
may advise other partners to follow a suboptimal course of conduct that
will provide a secret benefit to himself or a third party. As Andrew Gold
points out, a conflict of interest is a unique source of vulnerability that is
different from the vulnerability that arises when one is subject to
another’s discretion.384 The fiduciary duty of loyalty punishes this type
of misconduct in advisory relationships; it deters the advisor from giving
conflicted advice, obtaining an unauthorized benefit, or otherwise acting
in one’s self-interest when giving advice.385
persons, by virtue of the law or their own contractual undertakings, owe duties of care to other
persons with whom they have nonfiduciary relationships”). This Article disagrees with this
account of the duty of care and ranks it as important as the duty of loyalty. The duty of care has a
different quality, but it is a necessary element to help ensure that the fiduciary acts in the
principal’s best interest.
382. The risk of conflicted advice does not arise solely from the exercise of discretionary
authority. An advisor with conflicted motivations can betray a client and abuse his trust. DeMott,
supra note 306, at 1259–60; Harding, supra note 201, at 70.
383. See Flannigan, supra note 235, at 38–39.
384. See Gold, supra note 4, at 2.
385. See FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 272; see also Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381
(7th Cir. 1992) (“The ward, the client, is in no position to supervise or control the actions of his
principal on his behalf; he must take those actions on trust; the fiduciary principle is designed to
prevent that trust from being misplaced.”).
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Disclosures of conflicts of interest play an important role here. J.E.
Penner explains that advisors owe a duty to disclose an interest in the
subject matter of the advice.386 Disclosure causes, or may cause, the
advisee to judge the advice differently—and perhaps refuse to follow it—
because of the chance that the advisor’s judgment in applying her
expertise was compromised.387 Thus, a failure to disclose a conflict taints
the advice and results in liability for losses the advisee incurs if he follows
the course of action.
In the cases discussed in Part I, an advisor was tempted to recommend
a course of action that is profitable for the advisor but not necessarily in
the client’s best interest. In Buxcel, First Fidelity advised the Buxcels to
buy the Fabers’ grocery store so that the Fabers would be able to repay
their bank loan. In Morris, American Bank’s Young advised Morris to
pay Wood out of her pocket and borrow from American Bank, which
allowed Wood to repay his delinquent debts to the bank. In Capital Gains,
the firm advised clients to buy certain securities without disclosing that
the firm was profiting from a run-up in the price of the recommended
securities. In EBC I, Goldman advised eToys to underprice its IPO shares
because Goldman would benefit when other Goldman customers sold
their IPO shares and paid Goldman a share of their profits. The fiduciary
duty of loyalty prohibits precisely this kind of conflicted advice.
Minimizing an advisor’s harmful conduct, such as giving conflicted
advice, through application of the duty of loyalty is one reason to impose
a fiduciary obligation. An advisor might also take advantage of a client’s
trust by shirking—neglecting her responsibilities to act consistently with
the level of care and diligence required under the circumstances. The duty
of care punishes shirking by requiring an advisor to exercise the degree
of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar
circumstances.388 The duty of care helps ensure that an advisor will take
the positive steps necessary to give sound advice. It is not enough for the
advisor to act disinterestedly; the duty of care helps ensure that she acts
with diligence and prudence. As I have explained elsewhere, the twin
duties of loyalty and care work together to require that some action be
taken on the principal’s behalf while prohibiting these actions from being
self-interested.389
In addition to viewing an advisor’s fiduciary duty as guarding against
abuse, an advisor’s fiduciary duty also serves to promote advisory
relationships by signaling to a client that the advisor will abide by a
Penner, supra note 243, at *13.
Id.
FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 181.
See Arthur B. Laby, Juridical and Ethical Aspects of the Fiduciary Obligation, 13
JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK 565, 582 (2005).
386.
387.
388.
389.
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heightened standard of conduct. By assuming a strict fiduciary duty, the
advisor enhances her credibility when inviting the client to trust in the
manner described by Hinchman.390 The duties of loyalty and care give a
client, who may be reluctant to repose trust, the assurance that the
fiduciary will not act in an abusive manner, either by harming the
principal through giving conflicting advice, or by failing to provide
advice that is the product of care and diligence. Although one might view
fiduciary law as a substitute for the trustworthiness of fiduciaries,
fiduciary law rather serves as a reason to repose trust and enter into an
advisory relationship.391 In this sense, fiduciary duties can promote and
enhance trust and reliance that otherwise might be missing from an
advisory relationship and facilitate advice giving.392
Viewing fiduciary law from this perspective explains why certain
advisor groups voluntarily choose to assume greater duties and
responsibilities than the law would otherwise require.393 Although this
signaling may reflect a desire to build business, the means to achieving
this end is building trust.
C. Distinguishing Fiduciary from Non-Fiduciary Advisors
Not every nugget of informal advice, even where one might invite
another’s trust, creates, or even should create, a fiduciary relationship.
Such widespread application of fiduciary principles would dilute
fiduciary law and make informal relationships overly legalistic. Caselaw
is clear that not all advice, even when one party has superior knowledge
and attempts to profit from trust reposed, will result in fiduciary
liability.394 However, when certain advisors offer advice, a client will
have a reasonable expectation that the advisor will act in a fiduciary
capacity.395 In what circumstances should one conclude that an advisee
should have a reasonable expectation that the advisor will act as a

390. See Hinchman, supra note 329, at 358–60; see also Harding, supra note 201, at 64 (“By
assuming a role that entails commitment to norms of selflessness, a fiduciary may invite her
principal to trust that she (the fiduciary) will abide by those norms simply on the basis that the
fiduciary occupies the role in question and role-occupants, generally speaking, can be trusted to
abide by the norms entailed in that role.”).
391. See Harding, supra note 201, at 64 & n.23.
392. Id. at 62–63.
393. See, e.g., CFP BD., CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 3 (2018) (“CFP
Board’s Code of Ethics and Standards of Conduct reflects the commitment that all CFP®
professionals make to high standards of competency and ethics.”).
394. See Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 675 (Cal.
1983) (“[T]he efforts of commercial sellers—even those with superior bargaining power—to
profit from the trust of consumers is not enough to create fiduciary duty.”).
395. See Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6, 57–58 (Austl.).
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fiduciary? If advice does not always result in fiduciary liability, where
should one draw the line?
It might be best to start with an example. Let us return to the traveler
in need of lodging for the night. The traveler is looking for a clean,
comfortable hotel. During dinner at a local restaurant, the server
recommends the Garden Hotel, which is neither clean nor comfortable,
but the server receives a small payment from the Garden Hotel when he
refers customers and they book a room. These facts are unlikely to result
in a breach of fiduciary duty—although one might say that the server
invites the traveler to trust him, and the traveler expects that the referral
is in his best interest and not based on a referral fee. Why does the advice
in this hypothetical likely not result in fiduciary liability, and when should
fiduciary liability be imposed on those offering advice?
There is no single answer to this question and decisions in some cases
might seem arbitrary.396 Courts appear to look to when advisors behave
in such a way to lead advisees to have a reasonable expectation of
fiduciary liability. Such expectations are a product of various social and
economic factors viewed in the context of the advisory relationship.397
They are more a matter of social customs and norms that develop over
time than rigid criteria that can be repeatedly applied.
A classic case is Burdett v. Miller,398 where Judge Richard Posner had
to rule on whether an accountant, who also gave investment advice, was
subject to a fiduciary standard. In Burdett, Robert Miller, an accountant,
befriended Patricia Burdett when she took an accounting class he
taught.399 Burdett subsequently hired Miller to prepare her tax returns,
and she later asked him for help with investing.400 Miller advised her to
invest in a series of ventures that were rife with conflicts of interest on
Miller’s part.401 When the investments collapsed, Burdett sued Miller for
breach of fiduciary duty.402 In his opinion, Judge Posner noted that Miller
lacked discretion over Burdett’s assets.403 Judge Posner, however,
examined Miller’s role in the relationship and concluded he was a
396. See Velasco, supra note 3, at 88 (stating that, in terms of fiduciary status, “[t]here is no
obvious way to include some but not all advisers in a definitional or purely logical manner”).
397. See, e.g., Stewart v. Phx. Nat’l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937) (“[F]or some
twenty-three years the plaintiff was not only a customer of the bank, but its officers and directors
had been his financial advisors; that he had been told repeatedly of their friendship for him and
had relied upon their advice; and that by reason of such relations he believed they would take no
financial advantage of him.”).
398. 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992).
399. Id. at 1378–79.
400. Id. at 1379.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1378–79.
403. Id. at 1381.
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fiduciary.404 Miller was sophisticated; Burdett was unsophisticated.405
Miller cultivated a relationship of trust with Burdett and held himself out
as an expert in investing.406 Miller invited her to accept his advice and
rely on his professional and professorial status.407 Based on these
considerations, it was reasonable for Burdett to expect that Miller would
look out for her interests and act in a fiduciary capacity.
Reflecting on the social and economic context of advisory
relationships, several factors might give rise to an expectation of
fiduciary status by an advisor. This Section identifies three such factors,
drawn from relevant statutes or common law doctrines, and explains why
they are meaningful. The factors are the following: (1) how an advisor
holds herself out; (2) an advisor’s primary social, economic, or
professional role; and (3) whether and how an advisor is compensated.
This Section presents these considerations as candidates to help
determine whether to impose a fiduciary duty on an advisor—not as a
rigid three-part test.
Holding out. The most important of the three considerations is how
one holds herself out, or represents herself, to others. The more that a
speaker represents herself as someone who will provide expert advice,
the more appropriate it is to hold the speaker to a fiduciary standard.
Several legal doctrines rest on the principle that leading others to believe
something about an actor can ground liability.408 Under the doctrine of
apparent agency, for example, an agent has authority to act on a
principal’s behalf when the principal’s manifestations lead a third party
to reasonably believe the agent has such authority.409 The principal, under
apparent agency, must hold out another as the principal’s agent, and the
injured party must rely on the agent’s care or skill.410 Holding out the
agent as acting for the principal will result in the principal’s liability.411
Under the lesser known doctrine of estoppel by holding out, a person who
permits himself to be held out as a partner in a business is estopped from

404. Id. at 1382.
405. Id. at 1378.
406. Id. at 1382 (“[Miller acted] to invite her to accept his advice with no questions asked or
answered, in reliance on his professional and professorial status, on his insight into the arcana of
tax shelter investments—a technical area about which she was ignorant—and on a continuing
business relationship shading into a social friendship.”).
407. Id.
408. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Poseur as Agent, in AGENCY LAW IN COMMERCIAL
PRACTICE 35, 35 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2016).
409. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
410. See, e.g., Eads v. Borman, 227 P.3d 826, 830–31 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 351 Or.
729 (2012).
411. Id. at 831.
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denying association with the partnership and will be bound by its
contracts.412
In determining whether a stockbroker is subject to a fiduciary
standard, the SEC looks to whether the broker holds herself out as
providing confidential advisory services and represents that she will act
in a customer’s interest.413 Moreover, federal investment advisor law
exempts certain advisors from an SEC registration requirement as long
as they do not hold themselves out as investment advisors and meet other
requirements.414 To determine fiduciary status, Australian law looks to
whether one has held herself out as having expertise in advising.415 There
is no doubt that how one holds oneself out to another is meant to, and
will, have a direct bearing on the second person’s expectations with
regard to the first.
Primary role. When the provision of advice is a central focus of a
relationship between an advisor and advisee, especially when the advisor
is acting in a professional capacity, it is reasonable to expect the advisor
to give advice that is in the advisee’s best interest. By contrast, if advice
is provided as an afterthought or is merely incidental to another activity,
the advisor is not representing herself in the same way, and the advisee’s
expectations would adapt accordingly.
Certain individuals, such as lawyers and investment advisors, are in
the advice business. Advising is the heart of their work. Most clients
would not consider hiring a professional, such as a lawyer or investment
advisor, if her advice were unsound. That is not the case for other
professionals who occasionally dispense advice but doing so is not their
primary function. One’s expectations with regard to these other
professionals are not the same.
A banker is a good example of the latter category. Although financial
institutions often provide advice in the context of making a loan, advising
is not a bank’s primary role. A bank’s primary business is lending, not
advising, and banks typically are not considered fiduciaries. When a
customer’s relationship with a bank is one where advice predominates,
however, a court is likely to rule that the bank is a fiduciary. In Buxcel,
for example, advice was essential to the bank’s role with respect to the
Buxcels. The bank encouraged them to take out the SBA loan. It
412. Antoskow & Assocs., LLC v. Gregory, 629 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Time Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Hewitt, 228 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
413. Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 27 SEC Docket 629 (Feb. 18, 1948).
414. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(30), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30) (2018).
415. See Daly v Sydney Stock Exch Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371 (Austl.) (“Whenever a
stockbroker or other person who holds himself out as having expertise in advising on investments
is approached for advice on investments and undertakes to give it, in giving that advice the adviser
stands in a fiduciary relationship to the person whom he advises.”).
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assembled their financial package and advised them to proceed, forming
a fiduciary relationship.416
A determination of whether advice is a central focus of a relationship
is a facts-and-circumstances test. In making this determination, one might
consider the following additional considerations: (1) an individual’s
professional training and development or, in the case of a firm, the firm’s
historical development; (2) public representations of the individual or
firm regarding its line of work; (3) an individual’s day-to-day activities
or, if a firm, the activities of its officers and directors; (4) the purpose of
the primary expenditures of the person or firm—how it spends its money;
and (5) the person or firm’s source of income.417 This last factor—source
of income—should weigh more heavily than the others for reasons
explained next.
Compensation. A person’s compensation bears on how customers and
clients are likely to perceive that person, and it bears on reasonable
expectations with regard to the person. Empirical literature demonstrates
that people are more receptive to advice when it costs money than when
it is free.418 If an advisee pays for advice, he is likely to take the advice
416. See supra notes 42–51 and accompanying text. The IAA codifies the primary activity
thesis to determine when certain professionals would be considered investment advisors and
subject to fiduciary duties. Under the IAA, certain professionals—lawyers, accountants,
engineers, teachers, and brokers—are excluded from the definition of investment advisor as long
as their advisory activity is “solely incidental” to their other professional conduct. Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(B), (C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B), (C). In the case of
broker-dealers, a second condition is that the broker must “receive[] no special compensation” for
providing advice. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C); see also Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360, 364 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a lawyer making “isolated transactions with a client as an incident to the
main purpose of [a] management contract” did not render the lawyer an investment advisor);
Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Serv. of Bos., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171, 188 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that a
lawyer is not considered an investment advisor if the lawyer, in the usual course of his normal
duties, also counsels a client as to the advisability of buying or selling securities); Applicability
of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons
Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed.
Reg. 38,400, 38,403 (Oct. 16, 1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276) (reiterating and clarifying
the standards in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(B), (C)).
417. These factors are based in part on In re Tonopah Mining Co. of Nev., Investment
Company Act Release No. 12712, 26 SEC Docket 426 (1947), where the SEC had to determine
whether a company was “primarily engaged” in a business other than investing, so as to make the
company eligible for relief from the Investment Company Act of 1940. See also SEC v. Fifth Ave.
Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (applying the factor test to determine what
business the defendant was “primarily engaged in”).
418. See Francesca Gino, Do We Listen to Advice Just Because We Paid for It? The Impact
of Advice Cost on Its Use, 107 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 234, 243
(2008) (“The results of the studies show that participants relied more heavily on advice when it
cost money than when it was free.”); Anthony G. Patt et al., Mechanisms for Enhancing the
Credibility of an Adviser: Prepayment and Aligned Incentives, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
347, 356 (2006) (“Participants who had the opportunity to purchase advice were significantly
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more seriously, and it is reasonable for the advisee to expect that the
advice is in his best interest. Why else would the advisee pay so dearly?
Like the primary role inquiry, a focus on compensation was codified
in the test to determine when certain professionals are considered
investment advisors and therefore subject to a fiduciary standard. The
IAA excludes stockbrokers who give advice to their customers from the
definition of “adviser” but only insofar that they do not receive “special
compensation” for providing advice and meet other conditions.419
Receipt of compensation for providing advice vitiates application of the
broker-dealer exclusion from the IAA, and subjects a broker who gives
advice to a fiduciary duty applicable to investment advisors.420
With these three considerations—holding out, primary role, and
compensation—in mind, consider the difficult case of an automobile
mechanic, or another skilled worker, who provides advice as part of the
services rendered. Why should the automobile mechanic not be
considered a fiduciary?421 A mechanic will diagnose the problem with a
customer’s car and provide advice or recommendations on how to address
it. Then, if the customer agrees, the mechanic will make the needed
repairs. Notwithstanding the advice provided, mechanics are not
fiduciaries.422 Before explaining why this outcome is consistent with my
approach, let us briefly explore the relevant arguments.
Richard Nolan asks why a car mechanic is not a fiduciary given her
power to affect a customer’s interests and the disparity of information
more likely to follow their advisers’ suggestions than were participants who received free
advice . . . .”).
419. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
420. This Article recognizes that, in many cases, determining whether advice is central to a
relationship and parsing an advisor’s sources of compensation will be difficult. The needed
information for such determinations is often not transparent. A bank customer, for example, might
not be aware of a bank officer’s role; nor is the customer made aware of the employee’s pay
structure. Wells Fargo customers did not know of the intense pressures the bank placed on its
employees to open new bank accounts and engage in cross-selling. See Emily Glazer, How Wells
Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled Out of Control, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:10
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-fargos-high-pressure-sales-culture-spiraled-outof-control-1474053044 [https://perma.cc/7AZS-78TR]. Moreover, a professional might obscure
these facts to convey a false impression that the professional is working in the client’s best interest
when he is not. The factors above might help determine retrospectively when an individual or
firm was holding itself out as a fiduciary advisor but not actually acting in the client’s best interest.
In those cases, fiduciary liability would ensue.
421. See Flannigan, supra note 235, at 28–36.
422. See Int’l Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 88 C 9838, 1991 WL
349914 at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1991) (“[A]utomobile mechanics or termite inspectors are not
normally considered fiduciaries of their clients, though they owe them a duty of honesty and
care.”); Thompson v. Wis. Cty. Mut. Ins. Corp., No. 95-3107-FT, 1996 WL 330363 at *1 (Wis.
Ct. App. June 18, 1996) (“An auto mechanic’s services occasion no fiduciary-like trust or
equivalent reposing of faith.”).
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between a mechanic and a customer.423 Nolan’s answer seems to be that
a fiduciary duty is not necessary for a mechanic because a customer can
control a mechanic’s actions through specific contractual duties to
perform a discrete task.424 One can specify constraints on the mechanic’s
conduct ex ante. By contrast, it is difficult to specify the necessary
conduct for a trustee or company director due to the manifold ways in
which they can perform their tasks.425
Robert Flannigan disagrees. Flannigan writes that ease of contracting
as an explanation for denying fiduciary accountability is erroneous and
does not reflect the relevant jurisprudence.426 Flannigan points to the risk
of opportunism as a reason to impose fiduciary liability on mechanics.427
A mechanic might use a vehicle for improper purposes, such as
transporting other customers or running errands, or she might strip the
vehicle of expensive parts and substitute cheaper ones.428
Leonard Rotman addresses this issue as well. Like Flannigan, Rotman
states that the mechanic has power over a customer, and the customer
becomes vulnerable to the mechanic’s abuse of power.429 Vulnerability
to abuse might necessitate fiduciary protection.430 In the end, Rotman
disagrees that mechanics are fiduciaries, writing that the relationship with
a customer lacks a sufficient degree of trust and confidence to merit
fiduciary protections.431 This Article agrees with Rotman, but not
necessarily with his reasoning.432
Nolan’s view is closer to mine, but the analysis relates to this Article’s
test of inquiring into the individual’s primary role. A customer typically
does not hire a car mechanic primarily for advice. Instead, a customer
hires a mechanic to repair the vehicle and, as Nolan indicates, contracting
for a repair is more easily accomplished. Like a plumber, roofer,
carpenter, or other skilled worker, the mechanic’s primary responsibility
is to complete a successful repair. It is true that providing advice may be
one aspect of the services provided. And many customers may demand a
diagnosis of the problem and an assessment of whether the promised
423. Richard C. Nolan, The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United
Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
413, 422 (2005).
424. See id.
425. Id. at 422–23.
426. Flannigan, supra note 235, at 31.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 252 (2005).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 252–53.
432. Rotman may be right that a customer and mechanic maintain an insufficient level of
trust to support a fiduciary relationship. If a customer leaves his car with a mechanic for diagnosis
and repair, however, then typically the customer is placing some level of trust in the mechanic.
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repair will be effective before acceding to the work. But few automobile
owners are interested primarily in advice—the goal is a working
automobile.
In addition, the automobile mechanic typically does not hold herself
out as an advisor. Automobile mechanics offer car maintenance, auto
services, and auto repairs. It is nonsensical to think of automobile
mechanics as offering advisory services with respect to the customer’s
automobile. Thus, under the first two considerations, mechanics are not
fiduciaries.
Compensation is relevant as well. From the customer’s perspective,
payment to the automobile mechanic is primarily for repairs. From the
mechanic’s perspective, the customer is likely paying for both advice and
repairs (and the cost of repairs will include the time it takes to diagnose
the problem). From the customer’s perspective, however, the
compensation is not primarily for advice. One might analogize the
mechanic to a stockbroker paid on commission, where fiduciary law is
clearer. A broker provides advice and executes trades on a customer’s
behalf. The customer pays a commission on each trade, and commission
pricing builds in compensation for advice incidental to brokerage. From
the customer’s perspective, however, he is paying for trade execution, not
for advice. As this Article discusses, brokers are not considered
fiduciaries unless special circumstances transform a standard brokerage
relationship into a fiduciary relationship.433 Thus, under the third
consideration above, mechanics should not be considered fiduciaries.
Before concluding, one can return to some of the other examples
referenced earlier. Take the traveler who received conflicted advice on
where to spend the night. The restaurant server did not hold herself out
as an expert advisor, her primary role was serving food and drinks, not
providing advice, and the traveler did not pay for the advice. The same
can be said of the librarian. Librarians serve many roles, including
research, cataloging, and programming. But they do not hold themselves
out as advisors; advice giving is not their primary function, and they
typically are not paid specifically for giving advice. Thus, one would not
expect fiduciary liability in these cases.
One can contrast these examples with leading cases determining when
to impose a fiduciary duty on an advisor. In the case of Burdett v. Miller
discussed above, each of the three proposed considerations was relevant
to the court. Judge Posner wrote that Miller held himself out as an expert
in the field of investments, in which Burdett was unsophisticated.434
Miller’s role transformed from one of accountant to one of advisor—he
433. See supra notes 81–97 and accompanying text.
434. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992).
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advised Burdett over a two-year period to invest in a series of ventures
and even sold Burdett his own shares in one of those ventures.435 And
Burdett paid Miller professional fees; this was not merely a social
relationship.436 Based on these factors, it was reasonable for Burdett to
expect that Miller would look out for her interests and act in a fiduciary
capacity.437
This Part demonstrates that advisors should be fiduciaries not because
they have discretion over the assets or affairs of their clients—because
they often do not—but rather because of trust that advisors seek from
their clients, and the resulting reliance and vulnerability that accompany
reposing trust in another. Advice and trust are complex concepts, but one
can view advice giving as an invitation to a client to repose trust in an
advisor. Trust is commonly associated with reliance and vulnerability,
and the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care both protect and promote the
advisory relationship. Finally, this Part addresses how one might
determine which advisors are subject to a fiduciary obligation. Recall that
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that one who gives advice for
the benefit of another is a fiduciary.438 Not everyone who gives advice,
however, should be held to a fiduciary standard. The discussion here
establishes limits on whether and when to impose fiduciary liability on
advisors.
CONCLUSION
Discretion is widely theorized as a necessary feature of fiduciary
relationships and fiduciary duties. Many, if not most, fiduciary scholars
conclude that fiduciary duties arise only when one party has discretion
over the assets or affairs of another. Along the same lines, scholars
conclude that the reason for imposing a fiduciary duty is to constrain the
fiduciary’s discretion, thereby preventing misappropriation, fraud, or
abuse. The discretionary authority view of the fiduciary relationship,
however, is not universally valid. This Article demonstrates that, in many
contexts, advisors who lack discretionary authority are and should be
considered fiduciaries to their advisees. Thus, the discretionary authority
view falls short as both a descriptive and normative theory of the
fiduciary relationship.
An advisor’s fiduciary duty is justified for reasons unconcerned with
discretionary authority. A fiduciary duty for advisors stems from the
nature of the relationship itself—a relationship in which the advisor
invites the advisee to repose trust in the advisor, and the resulting reliance
435. Id. at 1379.
436. Id. at 1379, 1381–82.
437. See Velasco, supra note 3, at 89 (stating that an advisor should be considered a fiduciary
when she is an expert in her field and likely considered a professional).
438. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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and vulnerability that accompany trust. Although not every act of advice
will give rise to a fiduciary duty, an examination of three criteria—
holding out, primary role, and compensation—can help determine when
courts can and should impose fiduciary duties on advisors.
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